



Unveil, O Thou who givest sustenance to the world, that face of the true Sun, which is now hidden by a vase of golden light ! so that we may see the truth and know our whole duty.

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## FIFTY YEARS OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

The fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research, which is being celebrated this year, is an event which most readers of THE ARYAN PATH will greet with sympathetic interest. Founded in 1882, the primary object of the S. P. R. was to make "an organised and systematic attempt to investigate that large group of debatable phenomena designated by such terms as mesmeric, psychical, and spiritualistic". Its aim, according to the preliminary Manifesto, was "to approach these various problems without prejudice or prepossession of any kind, and in the same spirit of exact and unimpassioned inquiry which has enabled science to solve so many problems, once not less obscure nor less hotly debated".

During the half century that has followed the formulation of

these excellent intentions, the S. P. R. has had the support of a succession of able, conscientious, and enthusiastic members, who have devoted in the aggregate an enormous amount of time and energy to furthering its objects. The result of their labours is embodied in whole libraries of Proceedings and other books, which contain a truly impressive collection of well-attested and classified facts in connection with abnormal psychic happenings. In the face of this mass of evidence, only the wilfully blind and prejudiced materialist will still venture to challenge the reality of the phenomena in question.

But our unstinted admiration for this aspect of the Society's work must not blind us to the fact that, beyond the accumulation of data, it has achieved very little indeed; and the reason is not far



to seek.

Just as there were many heroes before Agamemnon, so were there many explorers of the mysteries of the human mind and soul before Mr. F. W. H. Myers and his colleagues. Psychical science was not born in 1882. On the contrary, it is the oldest of all the sciences, its origins being hidden in the darkness of the far past. In every age and race it has had its students and its expert professors; and its broad principles have been handed down through the generations, both in writing, and, more especially, by oral tradition. But, because this ancient knowledge was not to be found set forth in orderly textbooks, and perhaps also because it was difficult for Western scholars in 1882 to admit that men of "inferior races," and in the so-called pre-scientific era, could have known anything worth while, the founders of the S. P. R. set aside all the traditional wisdom of occultism as being unworthy of their attention; and decided to tackle the subject *de novo*, using only the methods by which such striking results had been arrived at in the *physical* sciences during the preceding two hundred years.

This was their deliberate choice, for, had they been willing, they might have had the co-operation of Eastern psychologists. In her magazine, *The Theosophist* H. P. Blavatsky hailed the formation of the S. P. R. in the following words:

The new Psychical Research Society, then, has our best wishes, and may

count upon the assistance of our thirty seven Asiatic Branches in carrying out their investigations, if our help is not disdained. We will be only too happy to enlist in this movement, which is for the world's good, the friendly services of a body of Hindu, Parsi and Sinhalese gentlemen of education, who have access to the vernacular, Sanscrit and Pali literature of their respective countries, and who were never yet brought, . . . into collaboration with European students of Psychology. Let the London *savants* but tell us what they want done, and we will take care of the rest.

About the same time, one of H. P. Blavatsky's Masters wrote concerning the S. P. R.:

Its work is of a kind to tell upon public opinion by experimentally demonstrating the elementary phases of Occult Science . . . . We wish it well.

But the West ignored the East, and went its own way, unmindful of the crucial fact that psychical phenomena are different, not only in degree, but in kind, from physical phenomena, and are therefore not amenable to the same modes of investigation and study.

The method of physical research, in its quest for the laws that govern phenomena, is to observe facts, either occurring spontaneously in nature, or produced by experiment; to frame an hypothesis, which will explain them; and, finally, to test and confirm the hypothesis by further experiment. This method is valid so long as we can control our experiments, so long as their results are regular and invariable, given identical conditions. Physical phenomena have their genesis and field of action on the plane on which the senses and

brain-mind of the investigator operate: therefore he is competent to deal with them. But psychical phenomena only occasionally and spasmodically touch the physical world at all; just as a submarine may once in a while show traces on the surface of the sea by an escape of oil or bubbles of air. Their genesis and *modus operandi* are altogether outside the range of the ordinary man's perception. He may observe an abnormal psychic happening, but he cannot be sure of reproducing it experimentally. Indeed it is probably no exaggeration to say that not one psychic or spiritualistic phenomenon has ever been reproduced in exactly the same form during all the experiments and séances held under S. P. R. auspices since 1882. When it comes to explaining his facts the Psychical Researcher, who limits his methods to those of Western Physical Science, is in worse case still. He has either to admit complete ignorance, or to essay to use one class of phenomena, which he cannot explain, for the solution of problems still more obscure; as when the unaccountable possession of knowledge by mediums is set down to telepathy.

Inasmuch as the results of all investigations on S. P. R. lines are regular only in their irregularity, the hope of building up an *experimental* Psychical Science on the lines of the Physical Sciences must for ever remain a mirage. Before Psychical Research can be formulated

as an experimental science, its professors must qualify themselves by learning the time-attested laws governing occult or inner states and energies, as well as the methods by which they are controlled. Without this qualification, they are in the position of a man who tries to study oceanography from a boat with no appliances for making observations below the surface: with it they would be like the same man equipped with instruments for dredging, sounding, and generally exploring the ocean bed.

Perhaps the most useful work of the S. P. R. and its sister Societies has been their demonstration to a wide circle of hitherto sceptical people of the reality of telepathy and certain other varieties of psychic phenomena, which, be it noted, were perfectly well known to and under the control of earlier psychologists. But while they have made telepathy a familiar word to the man in the street, they have not begun to understand how telepathy functions. As Mr. Hereward Carrington tells us in his *Story of Psychic Science*:

. . . . Physical theories of telepathy have been abandoned of late years, and the question of its ultimate explanation has been left entirely open.

Of clairvoyance, he writes:

It is most baffling, and the truth of the matter is that we have as yet hardly the faintest idea as to how clairvoyance may be said to operate . . . .

And Mr. Carrington makes similar confessions of ignorance in respect of nearly every other type of psychical phenomenon.



Space does not allow more than a passing reference to the tragic blunder of the S. P. R. in accepting and promulgating Dr. Richard Hodgson's attack on the good faith of H. P. Blavatsky—an attack based on evidence which the defence were never allowed to see, and on the testimony of paid witnesses, after an "investigation," in which Dr. Hodgson acted as judge, jury, and counsel for the prosecution, and in which neither the accused nor any witness for the defence was invited to testify. This incident leaves a stain on the record of the S. P. R., which it is hoped may one day be removed by the withdrawal of Dr. Hodgson's Report.\* A full account of this matter may be found in Mr. William Kingsland's recent pamphlet, *Was She a Charlatan?* and also in chapter V of *The Theosophical Movement, a History and a Survey*.

The S. P. R. does not differentiate between psychical phenomena deliberately produced by

one who understands their *modus operandi*, and erratic manifestations through irresponsible mediums, because its members assume that there are none wiser in these matters than themselves. As they threw away a rare opportunity to study consciously produced phenomena, when they repudiated H. P. Blavatsky, they have naturally had to fall back on the investigation of the phenomena of Spiritualism, to which they have devoted an enormous amount of time and attention. During the course of the Society's history, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of séances have been held, and many celebrated mediums, have been subjected to the most elaborate and searching tests. Some prominent members have wholeheartedly avowed themselves converts to Spiritualism; while others are still uncertain if *any* of the physical phenomena of the séance room are genuine. As to the mental phenomena associated with mediumship, there seems to be

\*We will take this opportunity to print a letter dated 15th May 1930 from Mr. W. H. Salter, Hon. Secretary of The S. P. R. in response to this suggestion from us:—

"Sir Lawrence Jones has shown to the Council of this Society your letter to him of the 28th April, concerning Madame Blavatsky and the report published by the Society with regard to her in 1884-5.

I think you are under some misapprehension as to the nature of the reports published by the Society in its *Proceedings*. In every Volume of the Society's *Proceedings* is printed a note to the effect that 'the responsibility for both the facts and the reasonings in papers published in the *Proceedings* rests entirely with their authors'. The criticisms therefore of Madame Blavatsky which were printed by the Society do not rest on the corporate authority of the Society, but on that of the individual investigator, in the particular case the late Dr. Hodgson.

Any action therefore of the kind you suggest would imply that the Society had accepted a responsibility for Dr. Hodgson's criticisms which it has never in fact accepted. This seems to be one of the many cases in which the best course is to await the verdict of posterity which, in arriving at a decision, will take into account not only adverse criticisms made of Madame Blavatsky during her life, but also any evidence which may have come to light since of a contrary kind."

fairly general agreement as to their reality, cases of fraud being of course excluded; but, when it comes to explaining them, agreement ends. It seems to be generally admitted that, when knowledge, which could not have been acquired by normal means, is displayed by a medium, such knowledge must in many, if not most cases, have been conveyed by the mysterious action of telepathy from the minds of the sitters to the subconsciousness of the medium. One school of investigators appear to be satisfied that all cases may be so interpreted, but others recognise the inadequacy of this explanation in a vast number of instances, and adopt the "spiritist hypothesis," despite the grave difficulties inherent in it.

It is a curious and regrettable thing that the Eastern Occult explanation of this important problem, which was given in *Isis Unveiled*, in 1877, and repeated in more detail in 1881 (*vide Fragments of Occult Truth* in *The Theosophist* for that year), does not appear to have been considered at all by S. P. R. workers. In the above and others of her writings, H. P. Blavatsky declared that mediumship is a pathological state, and she explained the psycho-physiological peculiarities of persons subject to it. She stated that when abnormal knowledge, displayed by a medium, is not derived from his (or her) own

inner consciousness, or from the minds of the sitters, it comes nearly always from the "shells," or psychic *reliquiae* (not the spirits) of the dead. This explanation, which avoids the Scylla of Spiritualism on the one hand and the Charybdis of attributing impossibilities to telepathy on the other, affords a coherent and logical solution of such difficulties as the triviality or incoherence of most of the "messages," and the apparently dream-like condition that has been noted in so many of the "communicators"; and yet official Psychical Research does not so much as discuss it!

That there is, however, a tendency on the part of at least some members of the S. P. R. to adopt a deeper and wiser view of the whole subject, and to recognise that Man is not only physical and psychic, but is essentially an intellectual and spiritual being, is evinced by an article in the *Contemporary Review* for June, on *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the S. P. R.*, by Dame Edith Lytton, who says:—

I am of course only expressing my own opinion when I say that the solution of many perplexities lies in a clearer understanding of the supernormal powers of the human mind, for these may prove to be the link between ourselves in this life and ourselves in the next stage of life . . . . Too much stress has perhaps been laid on evidence of survival and too little on evidence of qualities and power which transcend the body here and now and would seem to indicate "the continuity of existence".



## INDIA AND OBJECTIVE REALITY

## I

[J. W. T. Mason wrote in this journal in August 1930 on "The Paths of India, China and the West". Since then he has been visiting the eastern countries. Some members of our staff had the benefit of his views on the present Indian conditions, during his stay in Bombay. His views and estimates are worth the serious thought of the scholar and the statesman alike; for, not only through their books but also through personal contact with Henri Bergson, Benedetto Croce and F. C. S. Schiller our author has acquired a philosophic insight, which he applies to all practical problems. In sending this article he writes to us from Japan:—

It contains conclusions forced on me during my studies in India, China and Japan, in the course of which I have been in communication with many of the principal leaders of the three countries. It is not possible to treat the Orient as a whole. There is no eastern cultural unity. You in India have a cultural affinity with us in the West and Japan has a materialistic affinity with us but China has no affinity at all with the Occident. Therefore I have treated in detail only India.

We had an opportunity of discussing this article with a friend of THE ARYAN PATH, and of India; at our request he has written his comments which follow the article.—EDS.]

When it is said that the West is vitally affecting the lives of the peoples of the East, what is meant? To interpret Western influence simply in terms of political freedom is to go astray in reaching a proper conclusion. *The West is affecting the desires of the East because in the West there are higher standards of living for the people and more material comforts.* Political freedom is nothing in itself. Political freedom, where it is successful, always is the outcome of a desire for material betterment and is always coupled with the discipline and technical ability required to create improvements in human welfare.

There is no record in history of a people first winning and holding their political freedom and secondly developing a desire for better conditions of living. The desire for betterment comes first; then comes political freedom. Political

freedom never is self-supporting. If the people, once they have secured political freedom, have not the competence to create higher material benefits for themselves, inevitably freedom lapses and there is political degeneration. So invariably does history record this fact that one may accept it as a law of creative life.

To find the trend of national consciousness do not go to the politicians in the Orient if you wish to discover whether the East is really being affected by the West. Rather seek to know whether the people are becoming fundamentally interested in improving their earthly existence; whether they earnestly want better homes and more expansive ways of living and whether they have the determination to apply themselves to the necessary study and acquire the necessary discipline and co-operation without

which the comforts of life for the people at large are unattainable.

In other words, *the influence of the West emphasises the necessity for developing a philosophy of objective reality.* It may not be a self-conscious philosophy, definitely worked out—though that can be done—but the people, as a whole, must consider the material world as real and must respect their individualities as real.

This is the foundation of Western culture. In that respect there is a single Occidental influence which is offered the East. There is not, however, any one culture characteristic of the East, taken as a whole. The three great countries of the East are India, China and Japan. Their cultures, their ways of life, their mentalities differ fundamentally. India has followed a spiritual evolution; China has followed an aesthetic evolution; Japan has followed an evolution uniting spirituality and aestheticism with utilitarianism. It is not possible, therefore, to examine Western influence on the East, as a single problem. Japan is accepting Western principles of material progress because of a natural inclination toward utilitarianism. China is floundering helplessly, under the control of self-seeking politicians, facing the impossible task of trying to develop political freedom before economic freedom.

In India, the problem is far more complex than in Japan or China. The Japanese temperament is not metaphysical. Realism has always been accepted by the

Japanese. One hears much these days of the mysticism of Zen Buddhism, which is an active force only in Japan. But, the Zen priesthood is intensely realistic; and it was Zen priests who led the development of Japan's overseas trade during the Ashikaga period, the priests being themselves commercial and financial advisers to the Japanese governing class and naming their trading ships after some of the great temples. That spirit of practicality is still very much alive in Zen.

China has tended toward metaphysics, but largely as a verbal pastime, not intent on creating new ideas. Confucianism, which seeks a static condition of society and provides rules for conduct, does not encourage creative mentalities. Intellectual adroitness, in metaphysics, has been the Chinese ideal. The desire has not been to gain results but to toy with words and phrases, in aesthetic admiration of what metaphysics can do. It is doubtful whether China really wants Western material progress. The Chinese show evidence of so much self-satisfaction and so much certainty that they are superior to all other peoples, that it is impossible to predict whether China will modernize herself for at least generations to come.

In India, it is different. Hinduism has given to the world the highest philosophic conceptions of Ultimate Reality the human mind has ever attained. It seems impossible to doubt that Ultimate



Reality is subjective or is of a nature even deeper than subjectivity. At least it is not objective nor materialistic. I believe Hindu thought has shown this very clearly and Western science is now moving to the same conclusion. Yet, we do not refuse to build a bridge because the iron and wood used to construct it have no ultimate reality of their own. We do not say: "wood and iron are only centres of energy called electrons without material basis, so why build a bridge and be under the illusion that it is real?"

What we do is to make the bridge and if it bears our weight and permits us to cross the torrent beneath, it is real enough for us. That is the method of the West. The method in India, to draw an extreme example, would be to suppress the desire to cross the torrent and so not build the bridge. The desire would be considered only an illusion and by overcoming the illusion, one would gain in spiritual enlightenment. I say this is an extreme case, but it is fundamentally true; and it illustrates the grave difficulty facing India's inquiries into Western culture.

Ultimate Reality is not objective. But, there is an Objective Reality, nevertheless; and by the Western way of thinking, it is not to be avoided nor suppressed. Rather, it is to be expanded and made ever richer and more varied. To seek to move back from Objective Reality into the subjectivity or "super-subjectivity" of

Ultimate Reality, while trying at the same time to adopt Western ways of progress is impossible.

I believe India's troubles to-day are due more to a misunderstanding of this fact than to anything else. Ultimate Reality, as worked out in Hinduism, is a magnificent conception. Objective Reality, as worked out in the West through the means of practical creative action, is no less magnificent, and perhaps is the greater triumph of the self-conscious mind.

During my journey through India last January and February, I met leaders and followers of every class. Two impressions more emphatic than others were left with me. *First, there is an unfortunate belief among India's young men that Western ways of thought are mechanistic. It is not sufficiently understood that what the West has gained in human benefits has been the result of intense struggle, of hard work, of self-imposed discipline. Second, there is little desire among the leaders of India to move outside the realm of phrases and get to work.* I think the second attitude is based on the first. It is a grave mistake for India to keep constantly harping on Western mechanism. It is true that the West will have to adopt other ways of life and will have to take into its own culture the knowledge of Ultimate Reality which India has contributed to spiritual philosophy. But, that is the West's own problem. The problem for India is to see the creative power which the West has put into its life to the

benefit of material welfare. India thinks too much in terms of sacrifice, as if sacrifice were a virtue instead of being a necessary evil due to man's incompetence in not improving his earthly lot. India thinks too much in terms of overcoming desires, instead of realizing that desires are incitements to creative action.

*India's splendid spiritual philosophy has become misinterpreted in India and needs re-valuation.* It requires restatements in ways wholly consistent with its fundamental meaning, and at the same time consistent with human progress. No great difficulty stands in the way. Philosophy in India should ask why Ultimate Reality has come forth as Objective Reality. The answer is not that interpretation of *lila* which implies Brahma wants to engage in a play or a sport for amusement. The only answer which will inspire a movement leading to human progress is that Ultimate Reality seeks creative action and development as Objective Reality. That is to say, Objective Reality is Ultimate Reality, or Brahma, or Buddha, or God, becoming external and self-conscious and seeking a material evolution. It is subjective Pure Spirit moving into objectivity in a quest for free, creative action.

As long as India refuses to accept some such interpretation of life as this, so long will India remain the prey of her own overemphasis on Ultimate Reality as the only reality. There are some signs that Indians are begin-

ning to see the light. One indication is the Presidential Address, delivered by Professor A. R. Wadia, of Mysore University, at the Sixth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, held at Dacca in December 1930. That address is far more important as a creative impetus for New India than all the manifestoes of the politicians. It ought to be circulated over India by the million. Too, in Mysore, there is Dr. R. Shamasastri, grown old in wisdom and understanding, a great scholar, who has not allowed cloistered scholarship to blur his vision of the realities of life. I like his analysis of the Manu injunction that a householder is justified in possessing enough reserve of wealth for three years—which Dr. Shamasastri works out to mean at the present time 200,000 rupees for a householder with ten members to his family ("Economical Philosophy of the Ancient Indians," published in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. XII).

In Calcutta, are intellectual leaders who are exploring new ways of interpreting Indian thought so that it will not hamper modern progress. They include such men as Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, now at work on an interpretation of life which emphasises creative action in the human sphere; Professor Nalinakha Dutt, Professor B. M. Barua, Professor Mahendranath Sircar, Dr. Kalidas Nag, Dr. Narendranath Law and Sir C. V. Raman. These and others I have met and discussed



with them India's outlook on life. Whether the currents that are being started in new directions will gather sufficient power to influence India at large is for the future to know.

Professor Raman told me that he recently received a letter from a Hindu asking why in his lectures he talked so much about physics and so little about metaphysics. Professor Raman said he replied: "My dear Sir, India and China have devoted themselves to metaphysics for hundreds of years and you can read the result in any morning's newspaper."

India must understand what that means or India will be lost. There is no salvation in this life through metaphysics alone, as far as a nation's existence is concerned. Raman points the way to the missing factor if earthly salvation is to be attained.

India once knew a full life, in accordance with the possibilities of development in the pre-Christian era. Tagore pointed it out to me, as we discussed together last winter at his home outside Calcutta, India's present plight. He said that *when Buddhism was in flower, about the time of Asoka, India developed a wide*

*spiritual culture, a high art and large material progress as well. India must return to that same co-ordination, but expressed in modern terms.*

How can it be done? I find the simplest and at the same time the most profound rule for the attainment in an article "Three Rules for Daily Practice" which appeared in THE ARYAN PATH for April, 1932: "Purity in Causation. Accuracy in Space. Punctuality in Time. Apply them to your own office work, if you please, and convince yourself that the higher life is highly practical."

Those are the directions for a true understanding of human progress. India must learn them, not by repeating the words, but by action. God help India if she does not learn them. There is no hope for her otherwise in this modern world where mankind is charged with expanding creative spirit, objectively, by means of purity in causation, accuracy in space and punctuality in time. There is enough mysticism in interpreting the right understanding of that phrase, in terms of human progress, to keep any mystic busy for a lifetime.

J. W. T. MASON

## II

[T. Chitnavis wrote in the first volume of this journal on "Three Kinds of Reading" and "Care of the Body". He is a born educationist, who has travelled in many parts of the world, a silent but careful observer of how the young are taught and how the adults teach themselves.

Mr. Mason's contentions and Mr. Chitnavis's plea bring to mind an old article written by "A Brahmin," a friend of W. Q. Judge, in *The Path* for December 1893 under the heading "India between Two Fires". He wrote:—

"On the one hand, the introduction of Western civilization is ever increasing our wants; on the other, we are, for many reasons, becoming poorer and poorer; many find themselves unable to make the two ends meet, others are in pinching want. While foreign luxuries are becoming common, our means of livelihood are becoming scarce, and we find ourselves *between two fires* as regards our economic condition.

You in the far West may not sympathize with our thoughts and aspirations, with our movements and actions, yet purified, regenerated India, rising Phoenix-like from the ashes of its dark Kali Yuga, would be able to yet instruct the West by expounding its time-honoured Shastric teachings, and in that relation, if not in others, it is bound to the West by the holy tie of spiritual sisterhood, a tie that can not, should not, be ignored by you."

Is there no escape from the two fires? Is there no possibility of using them instead of dreading them?—EDS.]

It is going to be difficult to write "a note" on this MS. It is full of thoughts not probed to the core by their father-creator.

I must begin by thanking Mr. Mason for his sincere interest in the future of India. Not having met him and talked about modern India with him, he will kindly overlook any misvaluation of his views. I heartily agree with his final conclusion; but whether he will accept my understanding of it is another matter.

Two very different propositions appear to him as one:

First he says: "The West is affecting the desires of the East because in the West there are higher standards of living for the people and more material comforts."

Then: "In other words, the influence of the West emphasises the necessity for developing a philosophy of objective reality."

These two are *not* the same thing.

"In other words" are not redundant words; their use reveals a fundamental misunderstanding.

The fact recognized in the first

statement constitutes a danger, the most grave danger which India is facing.

The second statement contains a remedy, the only remedy, which will save India to herself and for the world.

India's betterment will not come from the first; it is bound up in the second.

"Material comforts" and "higher standard of living" as ordinarily understood are bringing the downfall of the west. The motor-car morality, the cinema precepts and Hollywood examples, the contraceptive-ethics which not only connive at but encourage foeticide, are not the only progeny of "higher standards of living" and "material comforts". Virgin widows of modern India are bad, but "virgin" mothers of the west are worse. The former are a curse for which none can blame and all must pity them; but the latter? Of their own volition, inspired by their lessons in science and helped by their co-educational schools, they desire to indulge so that "experience" and "self-express-



sion" may result. Examples from other spheres of life can be multiplied. We say, show us a single institution in this second quarter of your twentieth century which has not suffered corruption. Even the best, your literature, is it not coloured by sex and selfishness both glorified without a sense of shame or of proportion?

Accepting for a moment Mr. Mason's premise that desire for betterment precedes political freedom, we might ask—what kind of betterment should India desire? Western civilization has helped people licentiously to indulge in material comforts and now that civilization is threatened. The moral and ethical aspects of buying and selling, of banks and capital, have been disregarded and now, as we would say "Karma is overtaking them all". Political and economic considerations are neither primary, nor so important as ethical considerations. We who love India and are aware of her wretched poverty and sad plight, do not see her redemption in that political freedom which would *follow* the desire for the standard of living which the west is finding out to be high in the wrong direction.

Mr. Mason thinks that Indian ideals of desire-control and self-sacrifice constitute our weakness. We, on the other hand, thank India's Gods who have impressed her with the virtue of sacrifice, for sacrifice is a virtue and is *not* "a necessary evil due to man's incompetence". We offer praise to India's Rishis who have taught

her not only the supreme value of overcoming desires, but also the right method of sense-conquest. "Desires are incitement to creative action," says our author. What kind of creative actions? Imagine a New York of chaste girls, of self-sacrificing bankers, of honest businessmen, of sincere advertisers (chaste, sacrificing, honest and sincere as we understand these words in our ethical philosophy). Would such New York not exist to-day if sacrifices had been made and if desires had been controlled yesterday? Would such a New York be so down and out as it is to-day? And what is said of New York is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of every city in the Occident from Los Angeles to Leningrad, and alas! is fast becoming true of westernized cities in the Orient.

But on p. 587 our author expresses the truth about the real cause of India's present-day degradation: "India's splendid spiritual philosophy has become misinterpreted in India and needs re-valuation." India's plight is not due to her not adopting the western standard of living and developing western craving for material comforts; nor will such adoption and such longing bring her anything else than the conditions now flourishing in the West.

We must not blame India's hoary philosophy but its misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Indian philosophy of the *Gita*, the summation of our philosophical thought, is just the philosophy which India needs. That

philosophy is objective without being materialistic. It teaches men and women not only to construct bridges of wood and iron, but also to build that other bridge which enables them to cross the stormy waters of Samsāra. The nation which only knows the former art perishes; the nation which knows the second also learns how to build a succession of crumbling bridges of wood and iron, and—lives on. Mr. Mason quotes the poet Tagore about Asoka. Well, Asoka believed in the maya of the world, and that is one reason why he built an Empire that endured, nay endures, for his is a living and vital example, his are practical and beneficent rules of life. India's downfall came when the flower of Buddhism was enjoyed, plucked, and without a thought for the morrow was thrown away; the tiny seeds of life in that flower were not preserved and sown in India; scattered they were carried away by the winds of Karma and fell in soils prepared and unprepared and of other kinds. The same is fundamentally true, though in another way, of Krishna who preceded and Shankara who followed the Buddha. Combine and unify the philosophies of Buddha and of Shankara and you have the philosophy of Krishna. That philosophy teaches that Ultimate Reality is neither subjective nor objective but both; it does not consider the other world more real than this, nor this objective earth superior to the subjective worlds. That philosophy is

not for India alone, but for the human family in both hemispheres.

Mr. Mason errs when he thinks that the problem of India and that of the West are different. "It is true that the West will have to adopt other ways of life and will have to take into its own culture the knowledge of Ultimate Reality which India has contributed to spiritual philosophy. *But that is the West's own problem.*" (Italics mine.) But is it? We say, it is one problem. Believers in Karma, we see the Motion of Law which brought India and Britain together for the education and benefit of both. The very political chaos will settle into a pattern when the builders of many kinds of bridges, be they Indian or British, learn how to build the Bridge of Life which enables people to cross the waters of ignorance and illusion. Let the West abandon the fancy that what it has evolved is a prize and a triumph. Let it dispassionately recognize the sour and even bitter nature of the fruits now ripening on its tree of civilization. When European nations, when the peoples of the two continents of America, recognize that their philosophy of life, labour and government implies the pursuit of personalistic happiness which cannot but compete and war against other persons and governments, then they will see that there is but one problem, the world-problem. Its solution will come through the Universal Philoso-



sophy which teaches that Reality is neither of earth, nor of heaven, but of that Compassion and Repose which are omnipresent; that Compassion sustains itself by ceaseless sacrifice, and that Repose by ceaseless control of the movement of desires and senses.

Fortunately the signs and omens are not all bad.

With the passing of every year there are more lovers and adorers of Krishna in the world. In every European tongue *The Bhagavad-Gita* is now available. In India (nay, in the whole world) no teacher possesses the influence over the minds of his students or over the hearts of his devotees as does this Divine Man—not even Muhammed in India or Jesus in Christendom. These two and Confucius and Buddha have more numerous worshippers perhaps, but none of them seems to wield the power and exert the influence of Krishna. The reason for this, it seems to me, is that none of them awakens that perception of the facts of Life which compels intellectual honesty and mental sincerity. The words and deeds of Krishna are potent sifters of man's thoughts and feelings. They expose us to ourselves, and more, they convince us that none can gain peace or power save by one's own endeavour to raise the self by the Self. This exposure, so humiliating to the mortal's pride, brings a vision of our inherent immortality, and thus unveils the truth that the woes of the world cannot be removed by some magical vicarious atonement. Christendom or

Islamdom may count a greater number of martyrs, the reason being that Christians look up to a crucified and ascendent Christ, while Islam up to a Prophet of prophets now active in the heaven world of Allah, each interceding on behalf of the faithful. *This engenders an other-worldliness, which is so peculiarly subtle as to escape attention.*

The other-worldliness which energizes the orthodox Buddhist is of a different nature and is rooted in a different soil. Recognizing that illusion (maya) of the world and ignorance (avidya) of man as due to the delusion (moha) of craving for sense-life (tanha) the Buddhist has emphasised the subjective aspect of Nirvana. While rightly disregarding the illusory nature of human personality and rightly teaching that it is ephemeral, transient and not worth troubling about, the Buddhist has not emphasised the existence of the permanent individuality which experiences Nirvana and attains Buddhahood. The Mahayana tradition, however, approximates the philosophy of Krishna.

The teaching which is pre-eminent in the *Gita* is—to do one's duty by every duty, and thus bring this world to duty. The injunction of Krishna is that each man must follow his example; he is in the world: "There is nothing, O son of Pritha, in the three regions of the universe which it is necessary for me to perform, nor anything possible to obtain which I have not obtained; and yet I am con-

stantly in action. If I were not indefatigable in action, all men would presently follow my example, O son of Pritha. If I did not perform actions these creatures would perish..." (III. 22-24). Nay more—to enable men to do this efficiently and worthily he insists, ever and anon, that in the heart of each, saint and sinner alike, Divinity is enshrined.

It is the *Gita* which destroys the view that subjective and objective realities are distinct, that heaven and earth are two localities; how?—by distinguishing between the personality which

survives not, and, the Individuality which can be made to survive on earth as it subsists in immortality in heaven. When men and women, irrespective of geographical and other distinctions, learn to live as Immortal Individualities, and kill in themselves the selfishness of personal desires they will no more find themselves in the predicament of Africa; that land of numerous gold-mines finds it very difficult to procure enough of gold for its own use! That is the state of India: full of gold mines of Spiritual Truth, but.....!

T. CHITNAVIS

Materialism and indifference to all save the selfish realization of wealth and power, and the over-feeding of national and personal vanity, have gradually led nations and men to the almost entire oblivion of spiritual ideals, of the love of nature to the correct appreciation of things. Like a hideous leprosy our western civilization has eaten its way through all the quarters of the globe and hardened the human heart. "Soul-saving" is its deceitful, lying pretext; greed for additional revenue through opium, rum, and the inoculation of European vices—the real aim. In the far East it has infected with the spirit of imitation the higher classes of the "pagans"—save China, whose national conservatism deserves our respect; and in Europe it has engrafted *fashion*—save the mark—even on the dirty, starving proletariat itself! For the last thirty years, as if some deceitful semblance of a reversion to the ancestral type—awarded to men by the Darwinian theory in its moral added to its physical characteristics—were contemplated by an evil spirit tempting mankind, almost every race and nation under the Sun in Asia has gone mad in its passion for *aping* Europe. This, added to the frantic endeavour to destroy Nature in every direction, and also every vestige of older civilizations—far superior to our own in arts, godliness, and the appreciation of the grandiose and harmonious—must result in such national calamities. Therefore, do we find hitherto artistic and picturesque Japan, succumbing wholly to the temptation of justifying the "ape theory" by *simianizing* its populations in order to bring the country on a level with canting, greedy and artificial Europe!

For certainly Europe is all this. It is canting and deceitful from its diplomats down to its custodians of religion, from its political down to its social laws, selfish, greedy and brutal beyond expression in its grabbing characteristics.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Lucifer*, May 1891, p. 179



## WHAT IS FAITH ?

[ J. S. Collis is the author of *Modern Prophets, Forward to Nature*, and *Bernard Shaw*. Our regular readers will remember his striking article "What is Philosophy ?" in our issue of January 1931. This essay on "Faith" also is full of Theosophical ideas, though we wish it had discussed the relation of faith to will. H. P. Blavatsky has described faith as "a quality endowed with a most potent creative power"; without this power faith is "like a wind-mill without wind—barren of results". The *Gita* states that faith is of three kinds and enumerates their signs and marks.—EDS. ]

"Science has in a hundred years transformed the face of things, left Religion in ruin, knocked Philosophy off its pedestal, and converted the world we live in into a seething cauldron." We may take that statement from Mr. W. G. Bond as a remark typical of the general western outlook after a century of concentrated science.

That it is a false statement is beginning to be understood by the new generation. Those who belong to that generation are ready to grant that Science has done many things; but one thing they see it has not done, and can never possess the facilities for doing—namely harm Religion or so much as singe the hem of Her garment.

There is no conflict between Science and Religion. How often we hear that phrase! And with what little understanding is it generally uttered! We hear it from the lips of scientists who piously flirt with religion or from priests who impiously flirt with science. A vague, comfortable phrase pronounced by the vague for the the vague—seldom fiercely with the sense of its abounding truth.

Yet it is just this truth which when grasped relieves us of a

tremendous intellectual strain and actually makes a great deal of our reading unnecessary. We are then free to advance forward in peace, rendering with perfect good humour unto Science and Religion those things which severally belong to each.

The reason why it has been thought that Science has undermined Religion is because the latter is hardly ever used in its right sense—and this because few possess it. Religion is a question of faith. And faith is not at all what it is generally supposed to be. It has nothing to do with the-will-to-believe. Faith is *fido* I trust; not *credo* I believe. Faith has no traffic with credulities and creeds. Faith is parasitic upon no beliefs whatsoever and fears no dogma. It rests upon a *foundation of trust* which rises in the mind of the individual on contemplating the universe. It does not arise in every person who contemplates the universe. Those in whom it does, possess Religion: those in whom it does not, are without Religion. Actually there are few in whom it does arise. *There are few faithful men; Religion is rare—a fact overlooked as a rule on account of the im-*

*mense number of those who profess it without justification.*

The feeling of trust may come, of course, by means other than that of objectively looking at the world. It is, however, one starting point of Faith, and in this essay I shall consider it alone. Take a concrete instance, then, of an experience producing an expression of faith. I observe, shall we say, "the moving waters at their priest-like task of pure ablution round earth's human shores." To put it more severely, I observe the course and final destination of the London sewerage system. I see it flowing into the sea. I expect it to make the sea foul, slimy, smelly, poisonous. Yet it does not do so. It enters the water, is translated, and soon becomes indistinguishable from the vapour which, rising into the air, eventually descends in the form of rain to fertilise the soil.

Now this fact, this Law strikes against my mind with such force, it seems so tremendous, so significant, so final, so promising that I draw conclusions: I say—*The universe must be all right; everything must be ultimately well if this daily miracle is performed.* That is an expression of faith; it is an argument of common sense following the contemplation of Law. It presupposes the *a priori* gift of being able to marvel at the spectacle. Those without that power can never have faith.

This feeling of trust arising from the contemplation of Law is continually supported by the

presence of Beauty. For the man of faith, indeed, Beauty even more than Law is the foundation-stone of all hope, philosophy, and religion. In it he sees the signal, the promise of absolute righteousness at the root of life.

The existence of these two things, Beauty and Law, is sufficient for those who really perceive them. It was enough for Walt Whitman:—"A mouse is miracle enough to stagger sextillions of infidels." "If the sun and moon should doubt they'd immediately go out" sang William Blake. The snap of this phrase answered the snap of his mind as, beholding the universe, he saw how *obvious* it was that if everything was not all right nothing could be right. "Have faith" wrote Edward Carpenter. "If the universe were alien to your soul nothing could mend your state, there were nothing left but to fold your hands and be damned everlastingly. But since it is not so—why what can you wish for more? —*all things are given into your hands.*"

We must face the fact that these men, simply on the strength of their affirmations, were prepared to delegate the whole problem of evil to a sub-committee. They dismissed it. There were many things they did not understand and in the tragedy of which they shared, but that which they did see at one glance was enough to take away their doubts—the cloth of Beauty and the Law. That was enough to go on with. It was too much. "If nothing



lay more developed the quahaug in its callous shell were enough." For them, as for all who really look at things, Purpose, most beautifully obscure, yet pervades the visible character of the earth. For them indeed "the moth and the fish eggs are in their place". For them the difficulty is not in being certain of cosmic government—"the wonder is always and always how there can be a mean man or an infidel".

Now we are asked to believe that Science has left Faith in ruin. Yet it could only accomplish this by taking away from men the faculty of Wonder—the handmaid of insight. Only if it could blind men's eyes and blur their emotions could it really undermine Religion. And perhaps we may grant that this is what Science actually has done. A century of concentrated science, producing so much machinery, has indeed had the effect of turning the eye from the main object and confusing the mind as the main issue.

Tennyson provides a painful illustration of this. He was the poet who is famous for "keeping in touch with the scientific thought of his time". He studied the findings of Science with great care, in strong contrast to the preceding laureate who protested that the Scientist would rather "peep and botanise upon his mother's grave". It is instructive to compare the utterances of these two men concerning the stars. Wordsworth, looking at the stars and not at the scientific books, addressed an ode to Duty—that is, to the Divine

### Principle:—

Stern lawgiver ! yet thou dost wear  
The Godhead's most benignant grace;  
Nor know we anything so fair  
As is the smile upon thy face :  
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds ;  
And fragrance in thy footing treads ;  
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong ;  
And the most ancient heavens, through  
thee, are fresh and strong.

Tennyson, looking at the scientific books and not at the stars, wrote the famous line so often quoted by the mechanists:—"The stars" she whispered 'blindly run.'" It did not occur to him that if they blindly ran there could be no Law up there at all—an idea which one glance at the incredible discipline of the sun and moon alone shows to be manifest nonsense. But he was so distressed by what Science had said concerning "atoms running about purposelessly in space" that he became confused and felt that the universe was a purposeless flux—a non-sequitur from which he should have been saved by common sense and common sight—the two most important senses).

The scientists had not meant to injure any one's faith. They had simply gone on with their work making new discoveries concerning the structure of the world, which brings us to our central point. Under the domination of a strange Climate of Thought, this era, from which we are just emerging, has been the victim of a gross non-sequitur. Namely—that *description and information amount to explanation: that when something has been described it has been explained.*

It has somehow come to be believed that scientists having given us more information concerning the universe, having supplied new descriptions of its evolving, have *therefore* explained its actual existence. This non-sequitur has twined itself like the serpent Error round the minds of a generation of men. Yet Science never explains.

Newton did not explain why a stone falls to the ground. It falls to the ground owing to the agency of Gravitation, he informed us. That is interesting; but not very interesting, for we do not reach a fundamental and are forced to enquire what gravitation is. It is really Speed, we learn from Einstein the latest describer. That also is interesting; but not very interesting, for we still have only learnt *how* the stone falls: we remain in the dark as to *why* these various agencies exist at all. Why does the stone fall? We still ask, and we are still answered—Because it falls. Darwin gave us superbly suggestive descriptions as to how life has evolved, but he did not attempt to answer why it should actually do so. Nitrogen and oxygen may combine to make air, something behind nitrogen and oxygen may combine with something else to make them, and so on back and back, but still we have only received descriptions of how a process works without being any further enlightened as to why it is there at all. The most brilliant botanist can do no more than describe a flower's Becoming: its Being remains the

Mystery. Information, however passionately pursued, however cherished by those who have fought for it through sweat and pain and hardship, however delicately built up, never becomes Knowledge, never becomes Truth, but remains information to the end of time.

Science has explained nothing. Of course this is really obvious to every one, since if the riddle of life had been solved we should have heard about it! What troubles men is the thought (equally foolish but more easily imagined) that Science has explained *away*. God has been explained away, and with Him Meaning, Purpose, Order. As soon as that thought began to rot the modern mentality the psychological group of scientists appeared, who seemed to be explaining away our deepest feelings. It was thought that "the complexes and ductless glands serve to explain the feelings," that "psychology explains away the awe of emotional experience" and so on. It was believed that the experience of ecstasy and of love were disposed of by an examination of their mechanism—a strange non-sequitur.

Those who do not see, those who do not love, those who do not feel—and it is true to say that there are many who lack these gifts in this Machine Age—easily fall victims to the scientist who says: "It has been proved that joy is purely a question of a good digestion, love purely sex, and in fact everything high and spiritual derived from physiology and



matter."

We do not know whether those things have been proved. Actually they are contrary to experience. But even if they were proved the man of faith would not be at all dismayed—for *no one has the least idea what Matter is.*

The position of this man of faith who is armed with absolutely nothing save Love, is very strong. It is interesting to note how those who are not thus armed imagine that he is in as much danger as themselves. Mr. J. W. N. Sullivan in his *Galileo or The Tyranny of Science* speaks of how the poets were depressed by the Iron Laws of the universe, and goes on to write satirically against the scientists—"Men who must have been theory-mad, soberly maintained that little particles of matter wandering purposelessly in space and time produced our minds, our hopes and fears, the scent of the rose, the colours of the sunset, the songs of the birds, and our knowledge of the little particles themselves." Yet in spite of his satire Mr. Sullivan fails to understand the position of the man of faith.

No poet, (and if I call upon poets more than others to support me in this essay it is because, as Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset has so truly said, the poets were the first priests and shall be the last!), no true poet is in the least distressed by the Iron Laws of the universe; on the contrary, as pointed out above, he is immensely encouraged by them. As for his attitude towards the atoms, electrons, and

neutrons who are also supposed to distress him, he is quite content to say—"Well done little atoms! If you have really accomplished all this, I am deeply impressed with your creativeness, and unconditionally put my trust in the ultimate righteousness of your cause."

We may note that those who are without faith soon reveal their ignorance of what constitutes faith by emphasising the two things which are supposed to undermine it—namely the Iron Laws of the universe and the flux in which the little particles of matter wander about. The man of faith, it seems, is exposed to two opposite dangers—too much Law and too little Law! Truly there is no co-operation amongst these enemies of Faith—the mechanists receive poor support from the fluxites. For when men have become blind and are without love and can no longer read the signature of Beauty, then, in their fear and in their fury, they too hastily seize any stick to beat the dog with—but it breaks in their hands, for they can never get hold of the right end of it, as there are two ends, and both are wrong.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the man of faith is in no danger from Science. Whatever the scientist may say, however confused may be his utterances and the utterances of those who are confused by him, the man who sees and trusts, need do no more than distribute praise as to the merit of each new description. However frantic the

flames of doubt around him, he walks as one unsinged amid the fiery furnace.

And it cannot be too strongly emphasised that those whose "religion" rests upon any other foundation than this little flame of trust, are in a perilous position. If they place their trust in any dogma, or in any theory concerning the arrival of man, the structure of the world, or the geographical situation of God, then indeed they are at the mercy of Science, and between them and it there shall and should be everlasting conflict.

Neither yesterday nor to-day has Science had any real power to undermine Religion. There was plenty of cause for Doubt before the nineteenth century! Men were confronted with the same problems of evil and pain and disease at all times. There has always been cause for Doubt; and always if it has been dispelled the same agency has dispelled—the power to see, and seeing, accept.

Science cannot take faith away until it causes the loss of eyesight and insight. It can only confuse weak men as to what they really think by non-sequitous pronouncements, long words, and anæmic prose. The quality of faith is hard in that it can never be given to any man as other things are given; but it is blessed in that from him who truly wins it, it cannot be taken away.

Let us finish by getting clear regarding one thing conveniently forgotten by clever men. The opposite to Faith is not what is generally supposed. The man without that faculty is, he supposes, a superior person who disdains superstition, tests all things before believing them, and lives with olympian calm under the banner of scepticism. I wish I could think so. But it is not so. The opposite to Faith is lack of insight and imagination, it is blindness, deafness and fear—taking away the vitality which goes with Purpose and Meaning.

J. S. COLLIS



## IS POVERTY THE BADGE OF SAINTS ?

[ In her recently published novel *New Heaven, New Earth*, Miss Phoebe Fenwick Gaye wrote that "the action of bestowing makes the meanest beggar temporarily a king". She develops the theme in this article.—EDS.]

"It is more blessed to give" we are told, "than to receive,"—and, if interpreted truly, it is also far more pleasant. For to be able to give implies an abundance in the giver; whereas to receive sometimes—not always—implies a lack, a sense of poverty in the receiver which, if indulged in, may destroy the morale of a nation, or perhaps of a world.

After all, one of Man's first impulses in the baby stage is to give—and first intentions are often best! Nobody who has once witnessed the grave enjoyment of a baby in presenting something—a leaf, a cake-crumb, anything—to its mother, can doubt that *that* action gives it as much pleasure as it ever afterwards receives from the nicest birthday gift. But the world is singularly blind in appreciating this fact. The blessedness of giving—to ordinary tired humanity—may possibly be perceived later in some vague far-off world: it can certainly have no bearing on present-day conditions. It is charity to give to the poor, of course, but by now the very word charity itself is suspect, as our quotations show—"cold as Charity," "Charity child," and so forth.

In any case who are the poor, and what is poverty? Poverty has always been considered an essential part of the holy life, the

world knows, in every country and under every banner of faith. Just as in the main the great teachers of the past have praised the same virtues in man, and denounced the same sins. But especially in this question of poverty the brown and tattered cloak of Saint Francis may be said to have fallen on them all. Long, long ago poverty became the perquisite of religion, and bare feet and begging-bowls the sign manual of would-be saints as well as beggars.

And yet—poverty *as* poverty, is there any necessity for making a virtue of the thing? To follow in the footsteps of the Buddhas, Mahomet, Jesus Christ, was it really necessary for their followers to sell all they had, *unless they could give to the poor as well*? Obeying one half of the injunction is useless without obeying the other, and too often barefoot saints have found it sufficient to *take* from the poor without giving anything in return. It was as if they said "I am poor: I have nothing: therefore I am good."

But wherein lies the virtue of being poor? In the mere fact of owning no personal property? Then every workhouse pauper is more virtuous than the ratepayer who supports him—and no one in his senses believes *that*. No, the world has been labouring under a

great delusion in this matter of poverty—for surely if we examine the lives of those who first inspired the doctrine, we never find ourselves thinking of *them* as poor. How can we? It cannot be possible for one minute that they thought of *themselves* as lacking anything. Their renunciation of material possessions—pomp, power, riches—was no theatrical adoption of the tattered-cloak policy, but a very necessary shedding of *unnecessaries*. They had outgrown the need for these things, as a snake outgrows its skin,—and they shed them as inevitably and easily.

So it is with History's greatest men and women: they are born givers, not receivers. Conscious of no lack or loss themselves, they overflow with beneficences to others—though outwardly they may be "poorer" than their disciples. We may be certain that the thought "I am poor: I have nothing" enters their heads as little as it enters the head of the baby presenting the leaf to its mother. Rather, they have so *much* of what is essential that poverty is about the last word one can apply to them! They know that they have something to give to the world and proceed to give it, without fear of the consequences or thought of the future. Whether they express the gift in music or poetry, prophecy or good deeds, the result is the same: we think of them as benefactors. Schubert overflowed with melody as naturally as a waterfall: he may have had to sing for his supper in grim earnest

at the time, but who thinks of him as poor? Oliver Goldsmith was in perpetual money difficulties, yet he found time in the debtors' prison to write *The Vicar of Wakefield*, and toured the continent, paying his way by playing his fiddle at tavern doors. Was such a man poor, considering the pleasure he gave, the experiences vouchsafed him? . . . To turn to the Acts of the Apostles, was Peter poor when in response to the plea of the crippled beggar he replied "Silver and Gold have I none, but in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk!" Who can deny the affluence that was able to bestow the priceless gift of health? The "little poor man" of Assisi himself, whose example threw a whole country into a fervent misapplication of poverty, was *giving* all the time. Those hands of his we know so well in Giotto's pictures were not outstretched to receive anything, but to *give*—whether to birds or beasts or fellow-men mattered not to him so long as he gave, and the same is true in degree of all great figures. That, it seems to me, is the lesson Humanity has still to learn: that the true Charity is a *natural* outpouring of benefactions, an expression of the best in Man which should be as inevitable as the scent of flowers or the song of birds. The world is sick to-day with a surfeit of "the things which are Caesar's": it is still hungering and thirsting after a sufficiency of "the things which are God's,"—and that is not "Charity" in the usual sense of the word. In the



famous thirteenth chapter of *Corinthians* the word is used to signify an intense spiritual love—the love which inspired the outstretched hands of all the saints of all the earth—to *give* and not to receive,—and yet in giving to receive eternally. (For it is a commonplace by now that the hand outstretched to give is at the same time open to receive.) If such as these were poor, then blessed are the poor indeed, for they own the whole kingdom of Heaven!

PHOEBE FENWICK GAYE

Act individually and not collectively; follow the Northern Buddhist precepts: "Never put food into the mouth of the hungry by the hand of another"; "Never let the shadow of thy neighbour (*a third person*) come between thyself and the object of thy bounty"; "Never give to the Sun time to dry a tear before thou hast wiped it." Again "Never give money to the needy, or food to the priest, who begs at thy door, *through thy servants*, lest thy money should diminish gratitude, and thy food turn to gall."

But how can this be applied practically?

The Theosophical ideas of charity mean *personal* exertion for others; *personal* mercy and kindness; *personal* interest in the welfare of those who suffer; *personal* sympathy, forethought and assistance in their troubles or needs. We Theosophists do not believe in giving money (N. B., if we had it) through other people's hands or organizations. We believe in giving to the money a thousandfold greater power and effectiveness by our personal contact and sympathy with those who need it. We believe in relieving the starvation of the soul; as much if not more than the emptiness of the stomach; for gratitude does more good to the man who feels it, than to him for whom it is felt. Where's the gratitude which your "millions of pounds" should have called forth, or the good feelings provoked by them? Is it shown in the hatred of the East-End poor for the rich? in the growth of the party of anarchy and disorder? or by those thousands of unfortunate working girls, victims to the "sweating" system, driven daily to eke out a living by going on the streets? Do your helpless old men and women thank you for the workhouses; or your poor for the poisonously unhealthy dwellings in which they are allowed to breed new generations of diseased, scrofulous and rickety children, only to put money into the pockets of the insatiable Shylocks who own houses? Therefore it is that every sovereign of all those "millions," contributed by good and would-be charitable people, falls like a burning curse instead of a blessing on the poor whom it should relieve. We call this *generating national Karma*, and terrible will be its results on the day of reckoning.

H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Key to Theosophy*, pp. 205-6

## FIVE LIGHTS AT THE CROSS ROADS

### IV.—HILLEL

[**Geoffrey West** continues his fascinating study of some learned Souls in the early centuries of the Christian Era. He has already written about "Ptolemy Soter," "Apollonius of Tyana" and "Simon Magus". The last of the series on "Simon ben Yohai" will appear in our November issue.—EDS.]

Apollonius can scarcely be said to have founded a school; that of Simon Magus, as such, had a comparatively brief existence, and though Gnosticism, like Neo-Platonism, gave light to the Christianity which overwhelmed it, the triumphant Church so generally denied its secret knowledge that it must be deemed an obstacle to, rather than a channel for, the larger truth. With the burning of the Alexandrian library by a mob of ignorant fanatics, the doom of wisdom was struck in Egypt; enlightenment shrank back into the East whence it had come, leaving for the most part only a legend and a memory save, it would seem, among the Jews. For a thousand years the Jewish oral tradition, the Kabbalistic knowledge presently set down in elusive manuscripts largely incomprehensible to the uninitiated proved the most effectual channel of knowledge for the ignorant West. The *Zohar*, in particular, of directly Jewish origin and authorship, has been for the Occident, it is said, what the *Book of Dzyan* was for the Orient.

To seek the origins of this wisdom among the Jews would need a plunge far backward into eras of which Western history

has but little record. Israel was never, it is said, granted those higher keys which were the treasure of Egypt (Jewish tradition not unnaturally dissents from this, declaring Abraham to have been the instructor of Egypt), but their considerable knowledge had received augmentation and new impulse in the last few centuries B. C., first from Babylon and then, even more decisively, from Alexandria. Something of this has already been seen in the case of the heretical Simon Magus, but the influence upon orthodox Judaism was to prove more lastingly important. It is interesting to take such (at first glance) a purely national figure as Hillel, and to discover beneath the dark cloak of the typical rabbi the shining soul of the initiate. No miracles are ascribed to him, and the suggestion that, like Moses, he lived a life of 120 years neatly divided into three periods of forty years each, is admittedly allegorical rather than factual. The date of his birth is impossible, that of his death difficult, to fix with precision. Certainly he must have died before Jesus came to manhood and mastership; as clearly his sayings were still upon the lips of Jesus and his enemies alike.



He was born in Babylon of a Jewish family, and it was only when he had learnt all of the Law known there, that, a married man probably with children, he undertook the long and laborious journey to Palestine, as a provincial coming at last to the metropolis of knowledge. There he attended the lectures of Abtalion and Shemaiah, the most noted scriptural expositors of the day, as often as possible—for his meagre payment as a hewer of wood was not always able to yield him the fee imposed by the doorkeeper of the school. One winter Sabbath eve, being penniless, in desperate resort he climbed to the roof to listen at the window, and there was found in the morning; half-dead and overcome by the cold, for it was snowing, he had fallen asleep. Evidently his merit was already recognised, for despite the occasion he was hurriedly lifted down and revived, the teachers declaring that for one so worthy the Sabbath might be desecrated.

The times were far from happy for the struggling student. The Pharisees, to whom Hillel had attached himself, were in constant acute dissension with the Saducees, the temporary favourites of Herod. Their point of difference, the refusal of the Saducees to accept the authority the Pharisees allowed the oral tradition, is significant, but in fact the Saducees were much more politically than religiously minded; they sought rather power than truth or holiness. On their behalf Herod

persecuted their opponents at times remorselessly, and at last, perhaps on the deaths of his teachers, Hillel abandoned the unequal contest and returned to Babylon. A few years passed, and then work came to him from those who had been his friends and fellow-pupils in Jerusalem. The new heads of the school—Saducees—were said to have “forgotten,” or to be ignorant of, the teaching of “the pair”. Hillel knew the maxim: “Learn where there are teachers; teach where there are learners,” and conquering his natural modesty he accepted his duty. Arriving again in Jerusalem, he so utterly routed the Saducee elders on a disputed point by an overwhelming appeal to precedent and authority that they instantly gave up their headship of the school to him. Herod too, it appears, had grown weary of unceasing squabbles, and welcomed him as “a man of peace”. For many years he held the most honourable national position in Israel as president of the Sanhedrin, and though Shammai, whose great learning in the Law was reckoned equal to his own, came presently to share his place in the school, and was for a while to seem even to triumph over his finer wisdom, in the end Hillel’s teachings prevailed, and his descendants, bearing the honoured name of Gamaliel, became for centuries his hereditary successors as heads of the supreme Jewish council. He established in particular a tradition of peace. Through many periods of con-

flict his followers held aloof, guardians of a wisdom destined to endure beyond the rise and fall of empires.

In Christendom at least the name Pharisee bears an unfortunate connotation of self-righteousness certainly not due to the disciples of Hillel, and won rather by the temporary predominance in the days of Jesus of the influence of Shammai, in every respect a less attractive figure, proud and passionate in nature and holding to the Law in all the rigour of its application. He insisted, for example, surely with unnecessary virtue, that nuptial songs must speak only literal truth of the bride, where the much more human Hillel allowed that the singer might seek to see her with the bridegroom’s be-glamoured eyes. If the saying that “whosoever has acquired the words of the Law has acquired the life of the world to come” is correctly reported, it would seem to belong rather to Shammai than to Hillel, whose aim was always to stress the spirit rather than the letter. He held it evil to neglect due study of the Law, or, on the other hand, to study it for material gain, but his deepest virtue, the true fruit of study, was to love one’s fellow men. Asked on one occasion for a summary of the Jewish religion in its relation to conduct, he replied: “What is hateful to thee, do not unto thy fellow man: this is the whole Law: the rest is mere commentary.” In hard times of warfare and high

taxation, he sought a milder interpretation of the Law for “the amelioration of the world”. As a judge he was merciful as well as just. Praising Aaron for his love of peace and of his fellow men, and for his illuminating exposition of the Law, he defined his own most evident qualities. And he not only taught the Law, but lived in accordance with his teachings. He was ascetic (the more flesh, he said, the more worms), benevolent, sympathetic, free-handed, pious, humble, humane, lovable. So great was his good nature that on one occasion, it is recorded, he played the part of footman for an impoverished nobleman, and the spirit of charity and warning against self-righteousness breathes through all his sayings.

Judge not thy neighbour till thou art in his place.

Trust not thyself till the day of thy death.

He who wishes to make a name for himself loses his name; he who does not increase his knowledge decreases it; he who does not learn is worthy of death; he who works for the sake of a crown is lost.

My humility is my exaltation; my exaltation is my humility.

Never could he be provoked to anger.

One prodigy only has been connected with his life. On that occasion many sages were assembled at Jericho, when a heavenly voice sounded out of the sky, saying: “Among those here present is one man upon whom the Holy Spirit would rest if his time were worthy of it.” The eyes of



all were turned instantly to Hillel. In his own day he was revered for the purity and depth of his scriptural exegesis; in him, it has been said, "came to flower the sweetest and strongest gifts that faith in Israel's God had power to stimulate".

In all these things he appears as a very typical if unusually gracious figure in the long and honourable line of the Jewish patriarchs. May we say no more? It is a strangely familiar image he uses in declaring the spiritual nature of man, likening the soul to a guest upon earth always to receive first consideration, and for whom the habitation of the flesh should be kept pure.

As in a theatre and circus the statues of the king must be kept clean by him to whom they have been entrusted, so the bathing of the body is a duty of man, who was created in the image of the almighty King of the world.

Not merely the relation of microcosm to macrocosm, but the unity of all existing things, appears in the epigrammatic: "If I am here—so says God—every one is here; if I am not here, nobody is here"; while a universal truth familiar to all theosophists is implicit in another saying also attributed to God:

To the place in which I delight my feet bring me. If thou comest to mine house, I come to thine; if thou comest not to mine, I come not to thine.

In those passages in the *Talmud* which claim for Hillel a knowledge of all languages, not only of men but of trees and herbs, hills and valleys, animals and even demons, most modern writers can discern only "grotesque exaggeration," yet what is this ability more than that of Apollonius to read the thoughts of all men without having learnt their tongues? Honour, it is stated, was accorded in Israel only to those who could prove themselves the direct and intimate pupils of some distinguished forerunner. Does not this in itself assume the importance of that oral tradition, that teaching not to be written, despised by the Saducees? Hillel spoke but little at large; his knowledge was publicly seen as a passive wisdom. Yet his disciples in the end prevailed against all others, and he was the teacher of Johanan ben Zakkai from whom Joshua ben Hananiah learned the esoteric doctrines he taught the famous Akiba, who in turn gave his knowledge to Simeon ben Yohai, father of the Kabbalistic writings.

GEOFFREY WEST

## TOWARDS WORLD-BROTHERHOOD

Below we print two articles which aim at one objective—attempts at realizing the ideal of a world at peace and engaged in constructive work to the glory of man.

The first deals with the culture of the generation of to-morrow, the second with that of the adult peoples of the world of to-day. The former visions the teacher as priest, the latter would like the politician to turn prophet.—EDS.

### I.—EDUCATION AND IDEALS

[George Godwin, novelist and biographer has contributed two volumes in "To-day and To-morrow series". Last February he wrote in THE ARYAN PATH on "The Rebirth of Western Civilization".

In the following article he pleads for imparting the "knowledge that lights the soul".—EDS.]

Education might seem at first glance a matter for the educationalist alone, but since the preparation of the rising generation becomes more and more obviously a major factor in the ultimate solution of world problems, education is to-day the concern of everybody. Past are the days when children may be handed over to the pedagogue and left to him to make or mar. In the past this process too often resulted in the latter eventuality. And herein we can see a fruitful cause of much of the chaos which harasses the world to-day.

The advent of a general interest in education has resulted in a healthy criticism of orthodox methods. The teacher is no longer left severely alone to handle the human material entrusted to him with something of the immunity of a monopolist whose craft is a sealed book to the lay mind. This is all to the good, for out of a widespread discontent with the results of school and university

training have emerged new ideas and, with them, ideals.

The post-war conditions of the world have forced us to look a little deeper into many problems that scarcely vexed our forefathers at all. We have set out to discover fundamental causes of world disorder and of that spiritual malaise that afflicts our age. And so we have come to first principles.

Among some of the finest minds of our time are to be found men and women who see in the educationalist the potential saviour of the world. And for a very obvious reason: it is he who moulds the pliant minds of those who will shoulder later the burden bequeathed to them by the folly and ignorance of ourselves and those who went before us.

The modern world is in a state of social, economic, and spiritual transition. Values, a few years ago accepted as fixed and permanent, are vanishing with a rapidity quite disconcerting. The sacred character of property, once regard-



ed as sacrosanct, has been challenged and the philosophy behind that veneration for possessions examined and by many found wanting.

Patriotism, still, alas, taught as a sort of pseudo-religion involving the diabolic principle in the form of the foreign State, nevertheless seems to the modern mind a dubious virtue until it can be given a wider expression. Everywhere, the old ideas are crumbling and the new slowly emerging into roughly articulated form. For the average individual, pre-occupied with the personal problem of survival in a world economic crisis, all this is bewildering and perhaps a little frightening. His once-firm faith has been shaken and in many instances shattered. His old values have been demonstrated as false. He feels about for the new.

And this is where the central problem of education impinges on everyday life as a concern touching every living human creature upon this planet.

When we look about the modern world certain aspects of it strike the mind with the force of the completely incongruous. There is an abundance of all things necessary for physical life, food, raw materials, fabrics, transport. Yet many starve and more live with the fear of starvation ever present in their minds. We see a world equipped with scientific apparatus and power beyond the wildest dreams of our great-grandfathers, yet we find alongside this conquest of the external world about us a sheer inability to harness knowledge to the service of wisdom,

We have used science as a weapon of war more often than as a weapon of healing, or as the instrument whereby social injustices could be abolished.

Who, then, is to set straight this weary world? I think the true answer is: the educationalist. And for this reason: he moulds the minds that will determine the character of the world of to-morrow, and as he moulds them so will that world be.

When the full realization of that truth breaks in on one's mind there comes with it an overwhelming sense of the awful responsibility that all parents and teachers must shoulder to-day, since evade it they cannot. Considered thus, the profession of the teacher assumes a priestly character. And one day, we may hope, it will be so regarded.

But what of it to-day? Communities reveal their scales of values by the manner in which they reward those who perform functions. *A society that showers rewards and honours upon victorious generals, while it systematically underpays and neglects the teacher, obviously places a higher value upon the art of killing than upon that art which teaches how to live.*

No other profession is so badly paid, so discouraged, so tacitly looked down upon. Yet, to his eternal honour be it said, the teacher more often than not attempts no balance between services and reward, but gives of his best freely and with enthusiasm,

There can be no doubt that it will soon be found necessary to revolutionize the status of the teaching profession. This will come about when we recognize the supremely important nature of the work he has to perform.

What is that work?

In the modern world education may mean many things. It may mean that smattering of the three "Rs" given in elementary schools—a smattering which has produced a just-literate class. This aspect of modern education is of questionable value. It has done much to destroy the old crafts, in their place it has merely given a capacity to occupy leisure by those avenues of escape provided by the cheap magazine, cinema and newspaper. Such education is merely a convenience and no more, and its value is a doubtful one by the criteria of usefulness and capacity to uplift.

Technical education has increased with the swift forward march of science and the technicalizing of industry. Here, again, however, the purpose is narrow, and the end clearly defined.

There remains such cultural education as is provided at a limited number of universities which remain more or less the close preserve of the socially elect or wealthy.

One defect is common to all these branches of modern education: it is their sterility on the side of constructive thought informed by ethical concepts. In other words, by that idealism whose

growth and dissemination is the only hope of the world to-day. It may be objected that the teaching in the humanities in the older universities does include, if indirectly, the idealistic. But does it?

Beginning with elementary education we find minds commonly coloured by a species of nationalism that postulates tacitly the wickedness and potential enmity of all other nationals and thus makes for that war-breeding nationalism that has ruined the world at a moment in history when every conceivable material weapon lay to man's hands for a reconstruction of a Golden Age. The technician is rarely taught anything beyond the curriculum of his work, Chemistry, Medicine, Law and the like. The older universities foster class feeling, which, after all, is but the expression of a narrower patriotism.

Yet in every case the application of broad ideas to education is possible. For example, the small boy receiving a free State education will only benefit from, say, the teaching of history if the facts are interpreted to him and given moral significance.

Like most men of my generation, my recollections of a Public School education, so called, are of the daily mastering of unrelated and isolated historical facts. One was taught the great battles of the world, even the approximate numbers slain. One was taught, too, the orthodox commandment: Thou shalt not kill.

But so dormant were the minds



of both masters and boys that we were quite able to keep these two things in watertight compartments in our minds. The single killing of a man was murder. We knew that, determined never to commit that heinous crime. But when we went from chapel to parade ground and set about preparing for the art of wholesale murder, just what we were about never occurred to us.

Obviously, then, *what is needed to-day is a system of education that shall interpret life to the rising generation.* Elementary education is not enough unless the future worker is taught to see his place in a scheme which is a *world* scheme. The technician is a barbarian still so long as he turns his knowledge and skill to bad ends.

On a recent occasion while chatting to an acquaintance, a man who has specialized in aerodynamics and the problems of flight, I remarked that his work must be of absorbing interest to him. His reply was disconcerting. He said: "Do you know to what uses I am putting my knowledge? I will tell you. I am working ten hours a day perfecting a means of releasing poison gas from aeroplanes rather more lethally than we can do it at present." And when I asked him why he did not give up such work he agreed that he would like nothing better, but pleaded economic necessity and the demands of a family.

The point is, however great the economic pressure, my friend

would not have stooped to the murder of a single individual, but was yet prepared, solely because of his early education, to spend long days in organising some holocaust for to-morrow.

The facts are indisputable. Our system of education ignores moral ideas and those new ideals of world peace and world brotherhood that are the only hope of salvation in the modern world. The children of our schools are not going to inherit a world where values are more or less permanent and peace universal as did the people of happier generations. They are virtually being prepared in a fashion to handle the greatest problems that have ever faced humanity.

As I have said, these problems are not those that faced our forefathers who had yet to discover machines and thus increase the production of material necessities and devise ways of swift transport for them. There is not a material problem in the world to-day that cannot be solved because of difficulties inherent in it.

*The world remains chaotic because the mental and moral approach of humanity is defective. The kernel of world problems is in the human heart, the human head.*

Thus the supreme importance of the teaching of a world view is paramount. The inculcation of formal creeds, each one in conflict with some other, gets us nowhere. The rising generation needs to have the problem which

will face it in later life clearly defined and stated. It needs, too, to be stimulated into the frame of mind that will desire to work towards peace and justice, the honourable and fair distribution of wealth, and the ultimate federation of the world.

Education, then, as I see it, is far more a matter of ethics than of scholarship. *Knowledge we need, but it must be that*

*knowledge that lights the soul.* In a world still torn by ancient hates there is need for ideals. Are we going to place before the young a grand conception of life, or are we going to commit the crime of perpetuating old hates, fears and indifference to all that makes life desirable?

That is a great question. Upon how we answer it depends the fate of the world.

GEORGE GODWIN

## PATRIOTISM OR NATIONALISM

[ **Vernon Bartlett**, London representative of the League of Nations Secretariat since 1922, is also the speaker on "Foreign Affairs" to the British Broadcasting Corporation in London, and has been so since 1927. His weekly wireless talks are on "Internationalism" and he has spoken many times on India in that connection.

After seeing active service during the Great War, he attended the Paris Peace Conference as Reuter's agent. He was on the staff of the *London Times*; special correspondent in Switzerland, Germany and Poland, 1919-20; correspondent in Rome, 1921-22.

Among his many publications the following have attracted much attention: *Behind the Scenes at the Peace Conference*, *The Brighter Side of European Chaos*, *No Man's Land*; (with R. C. Sheriff) *Journey's End*, as a novel.

The devil of nationalism remains to be exorcised in the west; meantime he has hurled his curse at the whole of the east, including India. The need for popularising such analyses and ideas as are contained in this article is great indeed.—EDS.]

In these difficult years when people are too busy arguing about the causes of present distress to plan a cure for them we are given a terrifying list of material obstacles to recovery. If it were not for tariff barriers, or for the too rapid nationalisation of industry, or for the loss to Europe for political reasons of the Indian, Chinese and Russian markets, or for the scarcity of gold to back our currency, or for the rivalry between

France and Germany, or for the existence of communist propaganda—if it were not for one or more of these factors, we are told, the world would have become, in Mr. Lloyd George's wartime phrase, "a place fit for heroes to live in". But all these are symptoms of a disease rather than its causes, and the disease is nationalism, which Professor Carlton Hayes defines as "a modern emotional fusion and



exaggeration of two very old phenomena—nationality and patriotism”.\*

To realise why and to what extent nationalism is an evil we must, then, first decide what is a nation. And of all the many definitions perhaps none is better than the one given by a schoolboy to Mr. Basil Mathews and recorded by him in his *Clash of World Forces*. “A nation,” declared this boy, “is a people who agree to live together and to obey the same laws”. Why these people should agree may depend upon many different factors. To a certain extent geography naturally plays a part, since people even of different language will tend to become one nation if they are isolated by the mountains or by the sea. Race, again, plays its part, although not to so great a degree as is generally believed, for purity of race is almost unknown in Europe where the sentiment of nationality is most dangerously keen. Even language alone is not decisive for there are many linguistic minorities which have become fused into a larger majority without any hint of compulsion. There is, for example, no real independence movement in Wales or in Brittany, and every unfortunate individual who wishes to enter the Swiss Government’s service must know French, German and Italian, the three official languages of his country. Lastly, both politics and religion may help to build up a nation,

and in the case of the Hebrews it is almost impossible to distinguish between nationality and religion, so that the desire to marry a person of another race is seldom strong enough to overcome this double obstacle of prejudice. And in considering all these factors the one point which is both clear and important is that, as the schoolboy said, nationality is the result of an agreement to live together far more than any instinctive feeling, as is patriotism. The consequence of this is that mankind has been less loyal to the idea of nationality than to the ideas of religion, democracy, and so on. Great minds have so frequently risen above it. “The whole world being only one city,” wrote Oliver Goldsmith, “I do not much care in which of its streets I happen to reside.”

But patriotism in its true sense is something very different. It is both bigger and smaller, for it covers a very limited geographical area, and yet it represents a very great spiritual force. In its implication of a love for our fatherland it surely only refers to that portion of a country which has become a part of our inmost feelings by reason of childhood memories. The *patria* of the Roman meant much the same as the *pays* of the French peasant to-day, for while the sophisticated have for their own ends confused the word with “nation,” the peasant who talks of his *pays* has in mind his village, the fields he tills, the river he fishes, the

inn where he drinks his wine. All those things are a part of himself, and in a confused way he knows that he would sacrifice his life to protect them just as surely as his wife would risk herself to save her child. His love of his *pays* is unselfish and ungrudging, and it is one of the tragedies and perils of our civilisation that we have exploited an almost religious incentive for materialistic reasons.

Plato, it will be remembered, felt that the ideal state should not contain more than 5040 free citizens, partly because that particular form of loyalty which I understand to be patriotism could not comprise a great population. But since the days of Plato, and especially since steam and electricity began to make the world so small, our material interests have so developed that our patriotic feelings have become distorted and confused. The labourer in his slum cannot feel so strong a patriotic sentiment as the peasant in his *pays*, and it is not by mere chance that communism is an urban product.

But if there is nothing envious or mean about patriotism there may be about nationalism. It was nationalism which prompted Stephen Decatur’s famous phrase “My country right or wrong,” and confusion between nationalism and patriotism is at the root of nearly all our troubles of to-day. Even the author of an exceedingly able article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* is not free from confused thought in this

respect, since he defines patriotism as an instinctive willingness, as old as civilisation itself on the part of every individual “to defend, even with his life, the interests of the nation into which he chances to be born, regardless of whether the national cause in which he struggles be in any given case good or bad, right or wrong”. But the idea of nationalism is neither instinctive nor old. It has now become a force to which all other loyalties, including even religion, are supposed to be subordinated. “Thou shalt not kill,” has been changed to “Thou shalt kill to extend the territory owing allegiance to thy national symbol”. Its growth has been helped by many causes, one being the disappearance of Latin as the current language between all the intellectuals of Europe, and another being the French confusion after their Revolution of the ideas of democracy and nationalism. Like the Russians of our generation, they tried to convert people to their ideals and to their language by use of the bludgeon, forgetting that a religion reacts differently upon an inquisitor and upon the individual whom he so earnestly desires to convert. What should have been an era of freedom became, in the words of Professor Carlton Hayes, one of “linguistic oppression and persecution for the benefit of a sovereign national state”.

The nationalism which led to the war of 1914 to 1918 was mild compared with the nationalism that we have known since that

\* *Essays on Nationalism.*



war, and which even to-day drives the world to spend nine hundred times more on armaments than upon efforts to maintain a reasoned peace through the League of Nations and its Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. Our patriotic instinct and our nationalistic culture have become so confused that our indignation when a foreigner ventures to criticise even our climate is now spontaneous. And yet nationalism, which has been developed in order to encourage material prosperity, must bring material ruin unless it can be modified, for industry that has developed under national protection now demands those wider markets from which national frontiers exclude it. We have built up means of production on a world scale and have then done everything we can to prevent the free flow of these products by barriers of customs duties, sentiments and national prejudices, which divide the world up again into a series of unhappy little units.

None of the causes of our present distress, to which reference was made in the opening paragraph of this article, would be serious were it not for this exaggerated feeling of nationalism, and every delegate to any international conference knows that he dare not agree to any compromise which might arouse the nationalistic wrath of the popular press of his own country. At a time when the human race has greater material benefits at its

disposal than ever before, it is threatened with the collapse of civilisation due to materialistic impulses which are entirely out of date. Machinery is not a Frankenstein monster which will destroy man, but an instrument which may teach him that unless nations can develop their ideas of loyalty in order to keep up with the development of their machines they must all perish.

The situation, however, is not so hopeless as it seems because of this all-important fact that nationalism, unlike patriotism, is not instinctive. If the idea of nationalism was superimposed upon the instinctive love of one's native soil there is no reason why the idea of internationalism should not be developed in the same way. A Roman felt loyalty, in the first place, to his City on the seven hills and, in the second place—and much less strongly—to the Roman Empire. The Greeks, with all their immense power and influence, looked upon Athens, Sparta or Corinth, rather than upon Greece as a whole, as their fatherland, and experienced an imperial patriotism covering the far-flung dominions which was cultivated and not instinctive. In neither case was there a distinct intermediate period of *national* patriotism which could be in any way compared with our nationalism of to-day. And if we once admit that nationalism is a sentiment that has been developed mainly to encourage our material prosperity, we should also be able to admit that internationa-

lism may be developed in the same way now that material reasons so obviously demand that it should be.

It has, of course, to be recognised that there can be no return to the old instinctive patriotism; like our other instincts it has had to be checked, modified or utilised in the interests of what we call civilisation. But there need be no limit, great or small, to the territory to which we feel loyalty owing to the power of this instinct. Holland and Spain, for example, have at times ruled over much vaster territories than fly their flags to-day, and yet the Dutchman and the Spaniard have not felt a diminishing loyalty proportionate to diminishing territory. In the same way the loyalty which we are encouraged to feel towards all people whose country is printed in the same colour on the map as our own may be extended indefinitely, since even in a small island such as Great Britain the Yorkshireman may find more spiritual kinship with the Fleming than with the man of Devon.

The issue which faces us seems clear. Unless we can escape from

the confusion between patriotism and nationalism, one of the finest sentiments of which the human being is capable will be so perverted that it will plunge the world again into war, and destroy all the best that we have inherited from past civilisations. If we cannot return to primitive patriotism we have to choose between "the modern emotional fusion and exaggeration" of nationality and patriotism which must lead to ever-increasing international rivalry, and a yet more modern emotional fusion of patriotism and internationalism which would enable us to realise that our right to love our own country, county, town or village is no greater than the right of everybody else, white, yellow, brown or black, to love his own country, county, town or village with the same freedom and to the same degree. It is not merely a matter of chance that a man who is about to sacrifice his life for his country generally visualises not an immense multitude of people who owe allegiance to the same flag, but the few streets or lanes, houses or fields, that he knows best.

VERNON BARTLETT



## THE WORSHIP OF BEAUTY

[Prof. D. S. Sarma is the author of *The Gita and Spiritual Life, A Primer of Hinduism* and other books. He wrote in THE ARYAN PATH for August 1931 on "The Path of the Lover in Poetry and Religion".—EDS.]

The worship of beauty is not like the pursuit of truth or the striving after righteousness. While these have never produced untoward results, men have often found beauty a snare and a delusion. Puritans all over the world look askance at those who urge the independent claims of beauty; and the lives of the artists in general and of the hierophants of beauty in particular seem to confirm their suspicions. No wonder then that the wise teachers of mankind have refrained from laying as much stress on beauty as on righteousness and knowledge. Nevertheless every cultured man must know exactly what beauty means, what forms it has, how far and under what conditions it is necessary for a harmonious self-development. There is beauty even in ugliness in which we are doomed to spend our lives, and its claims are insistent. To neglect them or oppose them would be as unwise as to overrate them or make them exclusive. In the one case we deprive ourselves of a great part of our happiness and probably of our knowledge of Reality, and in the other we lose all sense of proportion and degrade ourselves into mere voluptuaries.

What is beauty? Libraries of books give the answer and some of them are among the dullest

books that have ever been written. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Baumgarten, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Bosanquet, Bridges and Croce—to mention only a few names—have attempted to solve the problem in the West. And in our own country all the exponents of the Rasa theory following in the footsteps of Bharata, have done the same. Lollata with his *Utpatti-Vada*, Sankuka with his *Anumana-Vada*, Bhattanayaka with his *Bhoga-Vada* and, above all, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and their numerous followers with *Abhivyakti-Vada* have tried to probe the secret of aesthetic experience. But beauty remains a mystery. Systems of aesthetic philosophy designed to catch beauty are like the clumsy attempts of elderly Gopis to catch the immortal Child Krishna, who laughs and sports and eludes them all. To some thinkers beauty is the perfect symmetry of parts; to some it is a function of life; to some it is a form of knowledge, to some it is an experience of pleasure; and to some it is a revelation of the Spirit. Thus we have the mechanical, the biological, the intellectual, the emotional and the mystic conceptions of beauty. The main differences between them arise from the different points of view from which beauty is judged.

Some have taken an entirely objective view of beauty, while others have taken an entirely subjective view. Some have emphasised the formal element in beauty, while others have emphasised the expressive element. Some have identified themselves with the observer of beauty, while others have identified themselves with its creator. Some have confined themselves to the causes while others have confined themselves to the results of beauty. There is an element of truth in all these theories. The error lies in their exclusiveness. Beauty is the expression of Rasa, that is, of universal and impersonal emotion, as the Hindu aesthetic philosophers discovered long ago, and as Croce and his followers are explaining to-day. It expresses itself in harmonious or symmetrical form. It promotes the highest ends of life; and thus it brings us nearer to the knowledge of the ultimate Reality. Beauty is not entirely a thing of matter and form, for these are only its media. It is not entirely a thing of love and desire, for these are as much the result as the cause of beauty. Nor is it entirely a thing of the spirit for this is only its unmanifest or abstract state.

Beauty is one of the ultimate values of Life having its mysterious analogue in the bliss of Spirit on the one hand and symmetry of Matter on the other. Properly understood it is one of the pathways to Reality. The beautiful is one of the aspects of the Real. The aesthetic experience is one of

the phases of spiritual experience. Rasāsvāda is one of the forms of Brahmāsvāda.

This statement is quite different from the statement contained in the well-known but rather misleading lines of Keats:—

Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty; that is all  
Ye know on earth; and all ye need to know.

If by truth the poet means Reality, we know that beauty is only one of the aspects and therefore the statement is only partially true. If, on the other hand, by truth the poet means what is scientifically or logically true, then the statement is much less correct, for beauty is not necessarily truth, nor truth necessarily beauty, inasmuch as we have dreams that are beautiful and facts that are ugly. *Righteousness, beauty and truth are the three ways in which we apprehend Reality according as we use our moral, aesthetic or intellectual faculties.* Hence the cultivation of beauty is as important for us as the pursuit of truth or expression of righteousness. Art is as necessary for the development of the spirit as science or ethics.

But in one sense the statement of the poet seems to be profoundly true. Beauty is the unconscious perfection which all creatures attain when they are most true to the law of their own being. But in that case truth is not only beauty, but also righteousness. In fact, Svadharma, in the broadest sense of the term, connotes the three highest values of truth, righteousness and beauty. It connotes truth because the crea-



ture is true to itself. It connotes righteousness because the creature acts in accordance to the divine will, which is the law of its being. And it connotes beauty because the creature then becomes the embodiment of an impersonal and universal joy. Thus every act of Svadharma is a miniature perfection making the creature god-like for the moment. That is why the lilies of the field, as Jesus observed, never swerving from the law of their own being and taking no thought for the morrow are clothed in glory surpassing that of Solomon. All natural objects and creatures which instinctively follow the Law have an inimitable grace and perfection of their own. They are ensouled by the eternal bliss of Deity. But their circle of perfection is closed. They are truly *standing* examples of divine beauty. Man, on the other hand, who is free to swerve from the Law has not a circle of perfection but a spiral.

Let us now examine some of the practical considerations of the worship of beauty.

Firstly, it is the duty of every man in practical life to make himself sensitive to beauty and to cultivate the sense not only in himself but also in others around him. To a soul sensitive to beauty nothing gives greater pain than to be forced to endure the slovenliness of dress, coarseness of language and crudeness of manners—not to speak of the sight of a thousand and one unlovely objects. The only safeguard against such things is to establish standards of comeli-

ness in the public mind and to enforce habits of conformity. Meanwhile the worshipper of beauty should make himself a perfect example to others in matters in conduct, demeanour and dress.

Secondly, we must see that the beauty we strive after is not of the superficial kind. It is no good to be particular in small things and indifferent in big things. We should not be pennywise and poundfoolish in the pursuit of beauty. When beauty is superficial, it amounts to mere prettiness; when it goes deep into the heart of things and lies hidden by large masses which obstruct the view we have a difficult type of beauty called sublimity. And we have so many grades between prettiness which is small, easy and superficial and sublimity which is great, difficult and profound. The worshipper of beauty should be sensitive to all of them and should always be prepared to sacrifice, if necessary, the lower to the higher. He should train his eye to look through both the microscope and the telescope to catch the fugitive gleams of beauty in the universe. In judging a work of art he should never be carried away by mere appearance, but he should see whether there is as much internal as external beauty, and further he has to probe and see how deep it penetrates. Is it skin-deep, or flesh-deep or bone-deep? For instance, in judging a poem he has to ask himself whether the poet ever gets beyond mere beauty of words, and if he does whether

he touches the mere outworks of the soul or reaches the inner citadel, whether he is concerned with the appetites and pleasures of the flesh or with the imagination and the sanctities of the heart.

Thirdly, the worshipper of beauty should cultivate a wide catholicity of taste and learn to appreciate all forms of beauty. One of the benefits of studying a foreign literature is that the student acquires a catholicity of taste and learns to appreciate beauty in forms and modes of life—entirely different from those to which he is accustomed. It is no small thing from the point of view of culture or of humanity for a Hindu to learn to appreciate some of the beautiful ways of life of the English society which is so different from his own. Again, apart from the perfection of form it is the strange and unfamiliar beauty of the classics that explains their fascination for the modern mind. Similarly it is strangeness added to beauty that explains the lure of romance. Therefore the worshipper of beauty should ever be on the alert to recognise and welcome new forms of beauty in life, literature and art.

Fourthly, the worshipper of beauty should be entirely freed from the desire of possession. The difference between the higher goods and the lower goods of life is that the latter suffer diminution when we share them with others, but the former, far from suffering diminution, acquire an enhanced value. Beauty is one of the higher values of life in which there

are no exclusive property rights. In fact, many aesthetic philosophers maintain that disinterestedness is an inalienable condition of appreciation of beauty. Beauty should be admired or cultivated for its own sake for the pure joy that it brings to the mind—joy in the widest commonalty spread. Beauty should be regarded as an extra, above all utility, comfort or convenience. We have already seen that it is only when a feeling ceases to be personal and becomes detached that it becomes fit for artistic treatment and thus generative of beauty. The *bhāva* has to be impersonalized and universalized and converted into a *rasa* before it becomes beautiful. Art is supposed to possess the power of liberating us from all passions and calming our minds. That is what Aristotle calls catharsis. Art possesses this power because of the infinite or cosmic character of beauty. When the true artist waves his wand, the spirit of beauty sleeping in our souls is awakened, our *upadhis* are removed for a moment and we have a taste of the bliss of the Infinite. We then understand the meaning of the famous utterance of the Hindu aesthetic philosopher that *Rasāsvada* is akin to *Brahmāsvada*.

Fifthly, the worship of beauty should not degenerate into a sickly sentimentality or a hidden and exclusive cult. Aestheticism has become a byword on account of this mistake. Beauty, of course, is different from righteousness and truth. But all the three are



inter-connected. The aim of art is, of course, neither to inculcate morality nor propagate truth. But that does not mean that art can be divorced from morality or truth any more than the different faculties of the mind to which they appeal can be divorced from one another. Far from this being the case, the foundations of all great art are moral consciousness and ideal truth. A poet to be a poet need not inculcate virtue; he need not even be a virtuous man himself, but he must have a sense of virtue, he must love and admire nobility, generosity and heroism and must loathe meanness, coarseness and cowardice. Similarly, he need not be a constructive thinker, but he must know the value of thought and be able to transmit from the sphere of reason to the sphere of feeling the progressive thought of his age. If an artist or a worshipper of beauty shuts himself in his own chamber without taking part in the drama of human life, he defeats his own end, for the goddess he worships in seclusion will soon sicken and die. No, beauty is a flower that grows in the open air. It requires for its health the sunshine of truth and the waters of purity. Remove it to the dark chamber of falsehood or expose it to the fumes of vice, and it will perish.

Sixthly and lastly, the worship of beauty, as well as pursuit of science and cultivation of moral goodness, should always be guided by a profound religious

sense. Tolstoy points out in his noble essay, *What is art?*, that in every age and in every human society there exists a religious sense of what is good and what is bad, common to that whole society, and it is this religious perception that decides the value of feelings that should be transmitted by art. By religious perception, which is of course different from religious cult, Tolstoy means men's perception of the meaning of life. It represents the highest comprehension of life accessible to the foremost spirits of the age. This should be the guiding star of all the activities of the age, the actuating spirit of the artist and the scientist as well as the moralist. In all healthy societies progressing in the right direction religion, understood in its highest sense, should be the charioteer, and morality, science and art the horses under its whip. It is the charioteer that sees the way, the horses have to go as he directs them. Else there would be no safety for the men in the chariot. If the horses get out of hand and think they know better than the charioteer, Heavens help the men in the chariot—which is exactly the predicament in which the peoples of modern Europe stand. If on the other hand the horses are obedient, but the charioteer old and blind, again we say, Heavens help the men in the chariot—which is exactly the predicament in which we in India stand at the present day.

D. S. SARMA

## WHAT DOES DEATH MEAN TO YOU?

### III.—SPIRITUAL REALITY

[ **Max Plowman** concludes his meditation on Death. Theosophical students will note how he has arrived at the occult instruction about the death of the self which results in Second Birth, that of the Self.—EDS. ]

Unless we are prepared to adopt a position of pure fatalism and to regard death as "the blind fury with the abhorred shears" it is imperative that we should come to a clear understanding with ourselves about what we mean by Truth and Reality.

Perhaps the most challenging statement made in my preceding article was that "reality has being in complete independence of fact". The endeavour was made to substantiate this belief by citing Shakespeare's imaginative realisation of the dawn, and by pointing out that although the words

But look, the morn in russet mantle clad

Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill  
are a figure of speech and constitute *in fact* a lie, they express the truth because they awaken in the mind the full sense of the reality. We do not need a scientist to tell us that, when the dawn breaks, no sort of gentleman arrayed in reddish-brown homespun is seen starting upon an impossible walking tour. Every sane person knows that as evidence of the facts Shakespeare's statement is entirely untrue: that this is precisely what does *not* happen. The point is that the words *in themselves* are untrue. It is only when they call forth the active co-operation of the heart and mind of the

reader that they become true. It is only as the imaginative consciousness of the reader seizes upon the images which the words evoke and allows them to become reflective of his own experience that they become a perfect unified image of the reality of dawn.

Truth is not what it is vulgarly supposed to be—an accurate record of the facts. It is something vastly more. It is something that involves relationship and is incomplete without co-operation. It is something that is meaningless to us unless we actively contribute to it. It is a conditional state of being, not an absolute condition of stasis.

Now the implications of this conclusion are tremendous. For at one sweep we have demolished what is called objective truth. We have said in effect to the Roman Catholic and other Churches: There is no absolute which exists apart from the mind of the subject that conceives it. If you attempt to confine truth to the realm of fact you must substitute for truth some fixation of your own mind due to a misconception of the nature of truth. Christ on the altar, or God in heaven, is a fixation of the mind, a mind that has forsaken imaginative truth for the false security



of fact; and ultimately this conception must express, not the truth of reality, but the falsity of materialism. The mind that is looking for security in the direction of fact is proceeding in the opposite direction to the only way that leads to truth.

Truth is living reality: it is a condition of being; and because it is this, it cannot be contained in the record of anything that has been or may yet be. Truth is not dependent upon any fact in the universe: if all the facts of the universe were other than we know them to be, truth would be unaffected. Truth is the expression of the living relationship between subject and object. There is simply and absolutely nothing that can be taken and placed in isolation—not God himself—and then described as the truth.

Truth is relative, if by that we mean that it depends upon relationship; but truth is not comparative, it is not a matter of vague approximation. It is the result of fusion, and fusion either occurs or it does not. The truth of Shakespeare's imaginative realisation of the dawn is absolute truth because it upcalls in the mind perfect and complete image of the dawn as it is seen by individual perception. The experience of truth is always absolute and without the shadow of equivocation. So that those, like Pilate, who are scornful and impatient with truth because it cannot be presented to them like a philosophers' stone, are just as blindly in error as those who will

have it that truth is a stone, a church, a book, or an historic fact. Truth is relative, but absolute in the mind that conceives it; it is not less itself because it is dependent upon you and me in our subjective relations to it.

Now the truth that is expressed in complete defiance of the facts must obviously be wholly different in kind from the "truth" that is entirely dependent upon facts to support it. The reality that has being in complete independence of fact must be very different from the "reality" of the modern psychologist which is entirely dependent upon the conception of the psyche as a static mirror of environment. And the difference between them may be discerned if we note that whereas the first conception places all its weight upon the function and power of the imaginative consciousness, the second regards this creative element as belonging to the order of phantasy. And there can be no reconciliation between them. Reality that is only to be comprehended by the statement of poetic truth must remain inconceivable to the mind that sees in the images of poetic truth only the disordered sport of fancy. It is upon the truth of imagination or the truth of fact that we must all ultimately take our stand.

And what is this truth of imagination? It is nothing more than the perfect co-ordination of experience. *Consciousness is continually receiving images upon the retina of the mind.* These images are of something which the

imaginative consciousness accepts as reality, but which the unimaginative consciousness rejects because it cannot co-ordinate them by means of its rude criterion of fact. These images only become real in the mind that receives them by means of the imagination which grasps and co-ordinates them with previously received images. Thus the imaginative mind lives by a series of recognitions of ever-widening capacity, while the unimaginative mind walks the road of ever-narrowing ratiocinations. The one lives from his own stalk and finds nourishment upon every wind that blows; the other lives by a process of analytic verification that becomes in effect a process of progressive disintegration.

The imaginative consciousness that understands how reality has being in complete independence of fact will understand how reality has being independently of all phenomena; and only as it understands this can it have a true conception of spiritual life. It will know that the images of which it is receptive are not self-generated, because they are propagative in the complete body of experience and are therefore capable of belief. And if it is argued that this is to place truth in the position of subjective dependence, the imaginative consciousness can only reassert its confidence and show the validity of its faith by its works; for there is no proof that what the imaginative consciousness believes to be true is true. You can prove the truth of death, but you

cannot prove the truth of life. You can prove the truth of the fifth proposition of Euclid, but you cannot prove the truth of Beethoven's quartet in C sharp minor: the one is demonstrable, the other is only persuasive, and, if you are not persuaded, is meaningless. I cannot demonstrate the truth of

But look, the morn in russet mantle clad  
Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill.

Shakespeare himself can only appeal to the imaginative consciousness for recognition of this truth, and that he has done this implies a courageous and dramatic act of faith on his part. A corresponding act of faith is essential to the realisation of the truth, and this is only possible through the appeal to individual experience. The truth cannot be known in any other way. Dogma is as powerless to teach the truth as a stone thrown at the head is to instruct the mind.

What we know of this life must instruct us concerning the possibility of any other. And the greatest truth that we can learn from our experience of this life is that since nothing has true existence for us outside the imaginative consciousness, everything which has this existence there possesses the nature of being and is not subject to the laws of existence. All things are transmuted by the imagination and seen in their eternal truth. They are translated from the conditions of time and space to the conditions of eternal being; and it is only thus that we discover the nature of



permanence and know that the smile of love and the tear of woe belong to eternal verity.

The wonder of art lies in its power to make this miracle apparent. And how does the artist achieve this wonder? By the gift of himself. The primary hunger of love stirs the imaginative consciousness to recognition of the essential nature of an object and impels him to seek creative means of translating his recognition of truth into a semblance by means of the images begotten in his consciousness. His very power to accomplish this will be in exact proportion to the clarity of his vision. It is by his passionate belief in a reality hitherto unperceived that he is enabled to create the image of that reality.

Verse, Fame and Beauty are intense indeed,  
But Death intenser—Death is Life's high  
meed.

What does death mean to me?

Death means a change in the mode of living. It means freedom from the limitation of sense perceptions in the exercise of pure imaginative consciousness. It means a continuous life of vision, or none at all. It means release from becoming in the realisation of being. It means the final and complete death of that self which, as it now lives, stands between me and participation in eternal life here and now. It means the intensification of all the life I have ever known, until all is pure consciousness. It means the power to re-live yesterday and the power to ante-date to-morrow in timeless being. It means a destiny

of free-will. Above all, it means the simple continuity of whole or imaginative life, and the complete annihilation of partial or personal life.

In vision, how easily to be perceived! In fact, how fearfully obscured! For when death comes to steal heart's treasure, he comes as a thief in the night. Death closes the "five windows that light the cavern'd man". Death puts the shutters up; for the light that was, no longer illumines the house. Death hollows out silence, and the ear that listens for a voice hears the sss of death like a retreating wave. Death empties the world of meaning and makes a mockery of all its affairs. Death takes the heart that has hung in anguish and treads it under his ice-cold feet. He is without pity: he jeers at mercy: he wrings most savagely the heart most full of love. Death blinds with his pain and maddens with his cruelty. He draws his scythe about the body of youth, but will pass age by, leaving weariness to groan. Death casts a pall over the sunrise, and makes the sunset ache. Death splits the earth beneath the running brook of happy love and swallows all its joy in an abyss of tears. Death shakes the petals of life and holds up the barren stalk. He makes us to see so clearly that we recognise in every blade of grass the spear of pain. Eyes that have looked long at death grow fixed and stony. Death never answers.

Blessed be death; for there is that over which he is all powerful,

and that over which he has no power. Blessed be death; for when his wind has passed right us, then the self that stands between us and reality is swept away. While we could anchor our souls in any material thing, we were not free: there was anxiety for our possession, and belief that, with care, we could cherish it for delight. There was a strong secret chamber in the centre of our hearts which we held against the whole world: there was a fortress of self-defence that contained a shrine to be held if need be against the love of God himself. Surely, we believed, in this which speaks whole-hearted self-devotion, I am absolved. Surely in this, to which I give a love that would lay down its life, I am free to find self-release. Surely in the very sanctuary of love I can find a refuge for myself. The rest can go. All I have, I give freely and out of the fullness of my heart: here alone I claim the privilege of love: here alone I hide in a strong tower against the storm of fate.

But the whirlwind came and carried away our strong tower. It razed it to the ground and left us desolate. And because it was a secret tower, our nearest friends passed by unaware of what had gone. The one who contained the whole meaning and expression of life, died. And we died too—died in an agony of despair—died fighting all the way, from support to support, pleading with fate for pity and with life for a

single concession. Till there was nothing to defend: not a recess that pain had not ravaged, not a cranny of possession that death had not ransacked.

And still there is nothing.

And yet there is everything. For out of the whirlwind there came a still small voice, and it said: "For the possession of one thing you would gladly have lost the world. You have lost the treasure of your heart. Behold, I give you another world, and in it your treasure. You held it in fear, and your love was bound. See, I have taken away the fear and freed the love." And then we saw what death had power over, and what he could not touch.

All that is of self death takes away. All that would bind another to its delight, even by the finest cords of love, death snaps. Death rolls up the whole world of our existence and bowls it into vacancy. And we are left stark.

But gradually, and right out of the heart of pain, another world opens, a very still, very silent world, without time and space, but a world of such intense reality that it makes the old world look like a bubble floating in the sunshine, mirroring everything in beauty, but having the impermanence of a bubble and being as fragile to the touch. On that day we know that the new world contains the old, and is to the old as the earth to the bubble. We discover that it is a world of being where all things exist eternally without shadow of doubt,



or need of substance. It is a world where merely to think is to be full of action; where merely to desire is to fulfil the heart; where to remember is to return, and to anticipate is to realise.

And then we see that this world of being sustains and upholds the world of existence, as the air upholds the bubble: it enfolds the world of time as the air enfolds the earth. We cannot drop out of it any more than we can fall out of the air. From its living reality, the world that we know takes all its images. Nothing we can do can change or alter this world of being. It is. It has being in one eternal mo-

ment which is the moment of its perpetual realisation.

It is to this world we shall all go after the life of the body. "Go?" No, not go; we shall awake: when we rouse from the sleep of the senses we are in that world already, for it is the world of the reality of all that we now see expressed in the terms of sense. It is the world of spiritual reality.

It can be denied. Yet even those to whom it remains a fond chimera need not be wholly without consolation, for, gazing upon the form of love in death, there is abiding heart's ease in the thought: "As he is, so shall I be."

MAX PLOWMAN

Why fear that death which comes from without ?

For when the 'I' ripens into a self

It has no danger of dissolution.

There is a more subtle inner death which makes me tremble !

This death is falling down from love's frenzy,

Saving one's spark and not giving it away freely to the heaps of chaff,

Cutting one's shroud with one's own hands,

Seeing one's death with one's own eyes !

This death lies in ambush for thee !

Fear it, for that is really *our* death.

—SIR MUHAMMAD IQBAL

## YOUR LAW

[ Dr. Paul E. Johnson, Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University (St. Paul, Minnesota, U. S. A.) wrote on "My Duty" in our last issue. He completes his examination of the subject in the following article which deals with human law.

In Indian philosophy the one word Dharma is used for human duties, for man-made laws, as also for the laws of Nature which are active in every object and entity and give each its property. In the *Bhagavad-Gita* the whole subject is presented in a masterly fashion. Dr. Johnson has shown the relation of man and his responsibility to the kingdom to which he belongs ; we wish he had examined the affinity of the man of will, thought, and feeling with the whole of Nature whose laws are invariable and which laws provide the only correct models to be copied by human legislators.—EDS. ]

Between law and duty stands a widening breach. Duty is a personal matter, an individual viewpoint, a private affair; law is a common concern, a social standard, a public affair. Duty is particular, law is universal. An individual may make a rule for himself, but no man single-handed can make a body of laws. For law is over-individual, and even the king or legislator frames laws successfully only as he correctly interprets social demands. Duty is self-imposed, an obligation arising from within; law is legislated upon the individual from without. So the contrast stands between my duty and your law.

This contrast gains clearness as we trace the coming of law in human history. Laws develop in the community by the slow accumulation of precedents, in the gradual growth of commonly accepted folkways and social habits. Primitive people, of course, had no written law, but social regulations were not wanting wherever men mingled together in groups. In the struggle

for possession, quarrels had to be settled by precedent and established custom. Consequently hunting and fishing rights developed at one level of civilization; rights of pasturage and ownership of domestic animals at another; distribution of agricultural plots at another. And through them all, by habits and conventions of ownership, have evolved the legal codes of property, inheritance, patent, and copyright. Likewise family interests gave rise to marriage laws, business interests to laws of contract, rights of persons under political status to civil laws. So has grown up this extended body of legal regulations for controlling the complex maze of human relations.

It is obvious, therefore, that every valid code of law, written or unwritten, reflects the social interests of a civilization. Hunting rights indicate hunting occupations, pastoral rights nomadic life, land laws an agricultural existence. The Laws of Manu represent the early civilization of



India; the code of Hammurabi testifies of early Semitic civilization. Our Anglo-American law ( observes Roscoe Pound ) is the outgrowth of the feudal system, with its emphasis not on the will of the actor as in Roman law but on the idea of relation or social responsibilities.\* So law appears as a social product, representing a social order, declaring the social will.

Clothed in these robes of authority, law comes to the individual. "Here is your law—take it—observe it. This is the law—obey." The child may not want to obey. The adult may not like the law. But what can a lonely objector do against the united group? How can a child turn against the race that gave him birth? What does it profit a man single-handed to challenge his whole generation backed by countless generations before? It appears wiser to the average man to join his fellows and accept their law as his own. The lone wolf may have freedom, but he loses protection, comradeship, and the strength of united movement. He had better return to the pack. So the normally adjusted individual finds his place in the group, and takes his oath of allegiance to defend its constitution and uphold its laws. "Law is King of all," says Pindar, "mortals as well as immortals".

And yet there is always the minority—a growing minority it now seems—who refuse to accept the law of their groups as binding.

"What has your law to do with me? I did not make it. The bulk of the law was formed before I was born. Even the latest statutes and amendments were framed by legislators remote from my ballot. What legislator has ever consulted me, in so local an affair even as a traffic ordinance? Why should your law be mine?" So law is resisted as externally imposed. It is further resisted as formal and rigid, without insight to individual variation or flexibility for individual application. It is resented for interfering with private rights. And who is law after all to reign over us? When fifth century Athens awakened to critical spirit, it found legal systems man-made and concluded that if man is the measure of all things, every man may be a law unto himself. When twentieth century America awakened to critical spirit, it watched man making his laws and declared, "What man makes, man can break".

While this is logical enough, it is evidently lacking in understanding. Human laws are man-made and acquire such authority as they may possess on human grounds. Supporting laws on divine sanction is unnecessary apologetic of doubtful certainty. Law is a human institution and must win or lose its case, so far as we are concerned, at the bar of human judgment. The case of law rests on the question of human value. What is the

value of any law in particular, or legal systems in general for human life? From this approach, it becomes clear that the aim of a law is to define a human right. The English constitution began with the Bill of Rights, the American constitution with a preamble of man's inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It would invert the order to suppose that constitutions exist to support the government against the citizen; because historically, they have arisen to protect the individual citizen against the government. Likewise in common and statutory law, the aim of modern jurisprudence is to defend the rights of the individual against fraud or aggression.

The doctrine that regards law as enemy to freedom is a vicious fallacy. Without law, personal liberty is less rather than more attainable. Note the difficulty of defenceless pedestrians trying to cross a busy downtown corner without traffic regulations. Contemplate the risk of the individual citizen without police or fire protection, without health or quarantine regulations, without laws of contract, incorporation or legal reserve, without writ of Habeas Corpus, and the infinite network of regulations defining and defending personal liberty. Without these requirements of order, the good intentions of all would run amuck in the confusion and conflict of uncorrelated activities. For the speed at which we move and the density at which we are

crowded together would soon crush the individual and pulverize the civilization left without direction to run itself. The fact that we operate as a civilization instead of a human horde is the outcome of law-abiding conduct. In the complexity of human relations, we must co-operate to save the whole or the part, the values of the race or the values of the individual. The freedom of each is the lawful achievement of all. Human law is as sacred as human rights.

This is the claim of law as an institution. As such its human value cannot be gainsaid. But is law an end in itself? Having accepted law as an institution, we may yet involve ourselves in difficulty when we have to deal with particular laws. For not every law seems equally good. Many laws fall short of human need; others conflict directly with my sense of duty. Which is the final court of appeal—law or man? Shall law judge men or shall man judge the law?

For instance, in emergencies, shall law be inviolable? Would you break a speed law to get an injured person to the hospital? Would you steal to save a life? Jean Val Jean stole a loaf of bread to save a starving family. It might be necessary to appropriate an automobile to save a town from flood. Would you kill to save a hundred lives, as in case of a trainwrecker who could only be stopped by a fatal bullet? Or again in cases of clear injustice, what is one's duty? Would you

\* Roscoe Pound, *The Spirit of the Common Law*, pp. 22-24.



have broken the Fugitive Slave Law to help a negro escape before the Civil War? Would you refuse to be drafted if you could not conscientiously go to war? What shall be done with laws one does not believe in? If opposed to the Eighteenth Amendment, are you at liberty to break it? When, if ever, is law-breaking justifiable?

We shall probably agree with Jesus that man is not made for law but law for man. Law acquires its authority, by reference to human values, and if it comes into conflict with them should defer to the higher principle. But law-breaking, it must be admitted, is dangerous practice. To break anything is by that much to destroy, and law-breaking is always a destructive act. Every violation of law, no matter how trivial, is a blow at the whole legal constitution so important to human values. It is never a course to be entered upon lightly, therefore. The bulk of law-breaking to-day is careless or ill-considered, and as such warrants uncompromising condemnation. *Only when law-observance is the rule can exceptions justly be made in cases of emergency or conscientious objection. Only the conscientious law-observer has moral right in crucial issue to become conscientious objector.* And then only after a careful weighing of values and disvalues is it reasonable to conclude the values won may over-top the values lost.

It will be necessary to guard against deceiving ourselves at this

point. Duty may conflict with law, but weaker impulses come often disguised as duty. Wherever it is easier to break a law than defend it, we may justly have suspicions. It is easy to make exceptions for myself, on the excuse of circumstances peculiar to me. To correct this distortion, Immanuel Kant suggests that we universalize our problem and test the duty by viewing it as a law. "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law."\* If my defiance of law were by my act to become universal, leading everyone to do likewise, what would the outcome be? Unless it appears reasonable for every other citizen to act as I am going to act, the violation is hardly warranted by its total possible consequences.

Another test of duty in conflict with law is eagerness to bear a full share of the consequences. To break a law slyly with hope of escaping discovery is neither reasonable nor honourable. Any such escape-motive is *prima facie* evidence that a criminal impulse is posing in counterfeit of valid duty. The truly conscientious objector is one who resists the law by promptly and openly giving himself up to the authorities concerned in its enforcement. The honest law-breaker is one who invites the full penalty of his act; without evasion or delay. When all violations of law attain this character, and all violators of law voluntarily offer themselves up to receive the penalty, our erstwhile

\*Abbott's Translation, entitled *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 39,

crime-wave will have given way to legal reform. For there is no more effective protest against unjust and inhuman laws than peaceful yet determined surrender to their penalty. By this and other methods of awakening public opinion, laws may be reformed at points where they stand at variance with human values.

We are sometimes advised that law will be outgrown. If this means that all law will be laid aside, it is dubious prophecy. For law, as we have seen, is not a set of childish prohibitions, but a system of reasonable obligations which it is the mark of maturity to accept. And with the increasing complexity of advancing civiliza-

tion, orderly regulations assume increasing importance in conserving values individual and social. But in another sense, law is forever outgrowing itself. As Roscoe Pound declares of common law, its spirit is a process of unflinching growth. As one civilization outgrows its predecessor, so one body succeeds another in the evolution of law. No law or system of laws can be taken as final. Each is a social effort to interpret human needs. Many will rise and fall with changing human situations, and give place, we trust, to better and more adequate laws of the future.

PAUL E. JOHNSON

If it is just that a man of 40 should enjoy or suffer for the actions of the man of 20, so it is equally just that the being of the new birth, who is essentially identical with the previous being—since he is its outcome and creation—should feel the consequences of that begetting self or personality. Your western law which punishes the innocent son of a guilty father by depriving him of his parent, rights and property; your civilized society which brands with infamy the guileless daughter of an immoral, criminal mother; your Christian Church and Scriptures which teach that the "Lord God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation," are not all these far more unjust and cruel than anything done by Karma? Instead of punishing the innocent together with the culprit, Karma avenges and rewards the former, which neither of your three western potentates above mentioned ever thought of doing.—MAHATMA K. H.



## THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION

[J. D. Beresford examines the origins of Religion and religions. As long as modern knowledge ignores the incessant working of the law of periodicity or cycles it must continue to err and see the beginnings of civilization in barbarism, of philosophy in savagery, and of high ethics in petty taboos. If Mr. Beresford's article leads students and scholars to find out that modern religions, from that of the Vedas to that of the Quoran, do not represent any evolution but a process akin to devolution, the breaking up of the one, grand, universal Wisdom-Religion in numerous creeds, a great step forward will have been taken.—EDS.]

As a young man, recently freed from the restrictions of a narrow creed and anxiously seeking evidence against the beliefs and dogmas of the English Church, I found a comforting measure of satisfaction in tracing the gradual evolution of vicarious sacrifice back to the primitive beliefs of the savage. Frazer's *Golden Bough* appeared to me at that time and for many years after, as irrefutable proof that the religion in which I had been educated was nothing more than a development of primitive superstition originating in childish fears of the unknown, and that it could, for that reason, be regarded as lacking any authority for the thoughtful mind. Dogma had its roots in the apparently senseless taboos of the tribe; the god on the cross represented no more than a refinement of human or animal sacrifice to insure fertility or propitiate the thunder; and sensible people might, therefore, dismiss religion, all religions, as a false conception begotten from the simple terrors and infantile beliefs of early man.

Many intelligent men and women, still accept that interpretation and are content with it, just as the members of various

religions accept without any desire for further investigation the teaching of priest, parent or other guide whose opinion they have taken on trust. This relegation of further enquiry into the foundations of belief to some presumably higher authority, is symptomatic of the limitations of the human mind. We choose or accept a label and thereafter fit ourselves to match its inscription. We see that our premises work in certain relations and then, assuming them as universals, spend any thought we have to spare in that connection, in confirming the grounds of our faith. Behind this tendency lies the wish to believe whatever it may be, and behind the wish lies the terrifying complex of psychic and physical development that goes to the making of every human being. And it may perhaps be asserted without dogmatism that the nature of the individual's wish is largely determined by the stage of development to which he has attained.

The possibilities for various and contradictory interpretations inherent in material phenomena provide a curious kind of comple-

ment to these different attitudes of mind. We can always read into our selected data the special meaning that we are seeking. The instance I have chosen of primitive religion as observed in the beliefs and ritual of savage tribes, provides a sufficient instance. The interpretation already given is that of science and based on an *a posteriori* argument. We take the Christian religion and break down the claim for its inspiration by showing that it is not founded on any divine interference with human destiny, but is a natural development of primeval fears coupled with an unintelligent conception of natural processes. The argument so far as it goes is complete and unanswerable. The gradual development of the idea of vicarious sacrifice can be demonstrated in detail, and Sir James Frazer having done it very thoroughly, those who characteristically wish to believe the deduction that follows from these premises rest content in their belief in a mechanical world of cause and effect, which pursues its enigmatical course uninfluenced by any external agency.

There is, however, another interpretation to be put upon the same facts in this connection, a reading that may seem to be in complete contradiction to the first. Starting from the assumption of a physical and intellectual evolution strictly in accordance with biological theory, but disregarding the various means postulated as instrumental in originating and

perpetuating variation from the ancestral type, we are naturally perplexed to account for a phenomenon that serves no purpose in protecting or developing the species; this phenomenon being religion in its original and literal sense of a *binding* obligation.

Let us take, for example, the appearance of Totemism with its elaborate system of Taboos which must from the anthropological point of view have come very early in the race history. Why, one must ask, should a tribe of savages living a free life of comparative ease, deliberately invent for themselves these strange acts of unnecessary self-denial, each man deliberately eschewing the flesh, however tempting, of his own particular Totem? Again how can we account for the formulation of a law of exogamy whereby marriage between near relations was avoided, among people who in many cases had no knowledge of any causal relation between the sexual act and child-birth?

Inevitably there have been many attempts to explain this extraordinary emergence of religion among primitive peoples. The appearance has been assigned to dream, to fear and, by the Diffusionists, to a centre of culture in Egypt that spread by degrees about the entire world. But the two former explanations cannot be regarded as logically satisfying. They do not account for the facts and even so the postulation of dreams may be regarded as begging the real question. And



Diffusionism as expounded by Prof. G. Elliot-Smith, does nothing to solve the essential problem, since we are still left with no explanation of the *origin* of religion, which, is no more explicable as an evolutionary factor on biological grounds in Egypt than it is in the Australian Bush.\*

Yet curiously enough it is the Diffusionist argument, based on the observation of man's innate conservatism, which seems to me to provide the most powerful evidence for the deductions I propose to draw. In Professor Elliot-Smith's instance, "To obtain recognition of even the most trivial of innovations it is the common experience of almost every pioneer in art, science or invention to have to fight against a solid wall of cultivated prejudice and inherent stupidity." And the lower we descend in the scale of culture, the greater is the opposition to change, while if we press our enquiry still further back along the evolutionary scale we gradually lose all sight of anything that can be regarded as personal initiative.

In the pre-human forms of the animal kingdom we find habit, crystallised as instinct, the dominant guide of existence. In the insect world its strange elaborations are so inalterable that any

change in them means death. Even in those animals nearest to our understanding, it is unthinkable that any change in habit could be due to the expression of an inner impulse strong enough to overcome the natural routine ordained by this overwhelming rule of inherited instinct. Might we not therefore very forcibly argue *a priori* that the animal "man," evolved through unrealisable generations from such progenitors, would be characterised by just this inability to alter in any considerable detail his natural habit of living, unless it were under the compulsion of outward circumstances? Yet in fact we see him developing a ritual that imposes upon himself the need for effort and self-denial, setting himself strange, unnatural tasks that promote neither his comfort nor his physical well-being.

Now, although it is not possible to elaborate a case in an article of this length, it seems impossible to relate these queer beliefs of primitive man to a slow growth of intelligence. Totemism, for example, provides no evidence whatever of developing from a study of cause and effect, and exogamy is practised by peoples who are completely ignorant of its real meaning and purpose. Wherefore we are confronted with a body of well-observed facts

\* Upon the Theosophical account of the origin, I do not propose to enter here,—the essential matter will be found in Stanza IV of the second volume of *The Secret Doctrine*—, because however satisfying it may be to the initiated, it would convey little to those, the great majority of mankind, whose knowledge is derived almost exclusively from objective observation and reasoning. And in this article I am confining myself as nearly as may be to these instruments, attempting in the first place, to present the case for "religion,"—used here as a general term for the belief in humanity's spiritual being,—from the intellectual and logical point of view.

in the evolution of man, which is susceptible neither of a biological nor, from a materialistic standpoint, philosophical explanation. Both, it is true, have been attempted but the solutions offered, as has already been indicated, are not sufficiently inclusive to satisfy the scientific mind. All of them bear the marks, stamped too plainly to be overlooked, of the argument *ad hoc*, the resolute attempt to prove a preconceived deduction.

And I should evidently lay myself open to precisely the same charge if I now proceeded to argue the idealist case in this connection. This is one of the many instances, constantly presented to the pilgrim who seeks truth with an open mind, in which the puzzle is instantly resolved for him if he will make the assumption that man is a spiritual being, a belief insusceptible of proof from purely material evidence and outside the purview of science. Wherefore I do not propose to debate the question under consideration, but to admit frankly that my natural disposition of mind inclines me to find a sufficient account of the problem I have been discussing in a spiritual evolution that is yet in its earlier stages.

For I discover within myself the same promptings, however differently expressed, that compel primitive man to torture his flesh. In him it takes the form either of an apparently reasonless self-denial as in the examples of Taboo already cited, or in actual and exceedingly painful facial and

bodily disfigurements practised, apparently, in the pursuit of some horribly misguided conception of aesthetics.

In me this urgency is becoming conscious and reasoned. I refrain from the peculiar asceticisms of the savage and from those later developments of them that set Simon Stylites on his column and influences the practice of some forms of yoga at the present day. But I recognise it as springing from the same source, essentially one in its purpose, although it finds another expression through another instrument. I might, indeed, find a figure in music, and liken this urgency to the desire for harmony and rhythm which once weakly formulated on the tom-tom or the single notes of a pipe, can now be elaborated by a full orchestra.

In effect the single purpose of this inner urgency appears as an effort to attain control of what we recognise as the physical body. In the very beginning this gospel exhibits its tendency to self-denial or self-torture. It is at this stage a wordless gospel; it appears to have little relation to ethics; but it struggles continually against the natural desire for the satisfaction with the least possible effort of the bodily appetites. Simple man prefers ease, the fulfilment of his natural proclivities, the comfort of rest and repletion, but "the holy yeast works in his timid flesh," compels him from his sloth and his lusts, and prompts him to the making of ordinances that run directly



athwart his animal instincts.

The second broad stage of this urgency to self-denial can be studied in the history of the various religions that developed from these beginnings. All these religions have one feature in common, the need for denying the flesh. For the mass they imposed laws of restraint that now began to display a recognisable ethic. An object had been formulated, the attainment of a heaven as a reward for virtue, and although the laws imposed did little or nothing to fit the conforming congregation for the postulated bliss hereafter, they were, at least, of some service in the growing complexities of civilisation. The totem had grown into an all-seeing God, the rules of exogamy into the command for sexual chastity, and one new ordinance had taken a specific form in the duty of man towards his neighbour. It is the ordinance of all others which is least honoured in spirit, but the letter has been accepted in the West as embodying a religious duty for more than two thousand years.

But if this brief indication of the birth and development of a religious sense in humanity does indeed correspond to some reality, if it is in some sort an approximation to the living truth of man's origin and holds the key to

his destiny, what, it may well be asked, is the probable line of its further unfolding in the future? To that, again, I can give only a reply that indicates a personal predilection. Nevertheless, to me it seems inevitable that what has been called "religion" will in time be superseded. The feeble instruments by which man has sought to govern his body, the dogma and ritual of the churches, the idolatry of priesthood as the inspired guide, the exercise of purposeless self-denial, are but increasingly self-conscious elaborations of the primitive Taboo. If, as I personally have no doubt, humanity is to progress to a fuller consciousness, it will be by the way of the inner desire and not by the exercise of those inhibitions which the word "religion" properly implies. We are passing from the stage in which the spirit of man must fight, too often a losing battle, against the animal desires of his body, to that stage in which he shall be strong enough to lead them. And just as the great Teachers and Adepts of the past conformed to no existing religion, so as man grows in the realisation of himself not in relation to the physical world but to universal consciousness, religion as we now recognise it will cease to have any meaning.

J. D. BERESFORD

## NEW BOOKS AND OLD

### "THE PERMANENT THING THAT IS INDIA"\*

[H. N. Brailsford M. A., is better known as a journalist and a socialist than as the author of *Adventures in Prose*, *Shelley, Godwin and Their Circle* and *Olives of Endless Age*. He has been a leaderwriter to many papers, including *The Manchester Guardian* and was Editor of *The New Leader* from 1922-26. —Eds.]

A generation ago our conception of the origin of Greek civilisation and its place in history was revolutionised by Sir Arthur Evans' discoveries in Crete. It had been supposed that this Aryan race, descending in a state of barbarism on a beautiful land with a genial climate, evolved in a few centuries this ripe and gracious culture by the light of their own unaided genius. We know to-day that this civilisation of theirs had a long pedigree. These simple Aryans, blonde warriors who lived only for battle and the chase, broke into the mature and ancient culture of the Mediterranean, destroyed the fine flower of it in the Minoan Kingdoms of Crete, but none the less absorbed it, learned its lessons, and carried it in the end to a higher development than its first authors ever attained.

We are now passing through the same experience in our notions of Indian civilisation and its origins. Again it is the spade of the archaeologists that

brings its dramatic revelation, for Sir John Marshall's discoveries† at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa are destined to upset traditional beliefs exactly as did those of Sir Arthur Evans at Knossus. The parallel is singularly close. In India as in Greece we now realise that the Aryan invaders, gallant but unlettered warderers who knew nothing of city life, must have found, in the rich lands which lured them southwards, an urban civilisation already ancient and intellectually mature. After a period of turmoil and conquest, the older civilisation took its captors captive, and gradually imposed upon them its own thinking, its arts, its letters, much of its religion and perhaps its social structure as well. Again, however, in India as in Greece, the Aryans retained what was perhaps their noblest possession, their subtle and musical language, and imposed it (in the North at least) on the mixed population which accepted their sway. There is this difference, however, bet-

\* *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilization*. Being an official account of Archaeological Excavations at Mohenjo-Daro carried out by the Government of India between 1922 and 1927. Edited by Sir JOHN MARSHALL. In 3 Volumes. £ 10. 10s.

† The real discoverer was Mr. Rakhal Das Banerji; see *The Modern Review* of April 1932 (p. 367) and June (p. 703). —Eds.



ween the two cases. The ancient world which is emerging from the sands of Sind is still alive. The yogi of to-day and the votary of Siva retain a faith which had its origins five thousand years ago on the banks of the Indus. There were, indeed, scholars notably Oppert and Pargiter, who had reached these same conclusions by a brilliant and daring process of inferences. These cities that have risen from the desert confirm their reasoning by a direct appeal to our eyes.

The results of the work of Sir John Marshall and his colleagues are now available to the student in three superbly printed and beautifully illustrated volumes, issued at the formidable price of ten guineas. They deal only incidentally with the other equally important site, Harappa, nor do they include a record of the latest seasons of digging. There is much still to be recovered and revealed none the less, there is ample material here for study and speculation, and this book will rank with the work of Evans and Woolley among the formative influences of our time. It is so admirably arranged and so lavishly illustrated that the untravelled reader can hardly fail to get from it something of the thrill of wonder and awe that comes to the visitor who has the good fortune, as I had recently, to see these astonishing ruins. Sir John Marshall is on the whole cautious and reserved in the general chapters which discuss the Indus civilisation and its authors. He risks no guess as

to whence they came or the nature of their relations with the contemporary peoples who developed kindred but distinct civilisations in Persia and Mesopotamia. About two things only is he sure. He is convinced that these cities thrived round about the central date 3,000 B. C. for a period of 500 years. He is certain that this civilisation was sharply, even violently distinct from that of the Aryans, which it preceded by a clear millennium or more.

The impression that one derives from these ruins is of a civilisation opulent and orderly beyond anything that its contemporaries had attained. Sumeria had temples of unsurpassed splendour: Egypt squandered a kingdom's wealth on her pyramids. Here in *Mohenjo-Daro the object was rather to make life agreeable for the mass of the citizens*. Nowhere in the ancient world was domestic architecture so advanced before the days of imperial Rome. So much has been written about the great public bath (which probably had a religious use), the solid houses of burned brick, the elaborate system of public drainage, the townplanning evidenced in the lay-out of streets and lanes that intersect at right angles, that I need not repeat the details. One is curious about the nature of the municipal government, and the economic activities that supported so much wealth. As to that one can only guess. *Nothing suggests an over-shadowing despotism of the usual ancient type*. It is possible that these cities owed

their wealth to manufacture for export. They shared with their contemporaries all the industrial arts of the Chalcolithic Age. They grew wheat and barley, had domesticated cattle, sheep, pigs, dogs and the elephant, were familiar with wheeled carts, made pottery on the wheel, wove cloth, worked in gold, silver, copper and bronze, and used a pictographic script. How much of all this they invented or improved we do not know, but one discovery certainly stands to their credit. They first grew the true cotton, which even the Greeks knew as *sindeon*. One precious rag of it has survived. My guess based on the many dyers' vats that have been found, is that already round about 3,000 B.C. India exported this cloth. There is proof of trade with Southern India and Mesopotamia. It is not probable that these proto-Indians were themselves a sea-faring people, but there is evidence (subsequent to the finds recovered in this book) that they knew sea-going ships.

The climate of Sind was certainly less arid than it is to-day, but the Indus, indispensable as a great river was to every early civilisation, was then as now a turbulent stream. The city was often flooded and as often rebuilt, until at length the inhabitants seem to have lost heart and migrated elsewhere, taking with them all the possessions that they valued. The result is unfortunate for us. The finds are much less numerous than one would expect from the extent and the good preservation

of the ruins, and consist largely in such things as toys of pottery that were not worth removing. The dead were usually cremated (though fractional burials occur) so that we miss the pompous monuments that reveal the life of ancient Egypt and Ur. Whither the inhabitants went we do not know. This civilisation extended from Simla to Karachi, and in a simpler provincial form far into Baluchistan. Whether, as is probable, it had spread much further East remains for future diggers to discover. War was not an important part of the life of these cities. Their offensive arms were inferior to their industrial tools and they had no defensive armour—a fact which doubtless told to the advantage of the Aryan invaders.

Enough has been rescued from these ruins to prove that these people had a notable, even a great art. Their architecture indeed is rather solid than beautiful, though they may have carved wood. The few statues are all broken and some of them are poor, conventional work. But there is a little nude dancing girl in bronze, a typical aboriginal, who moves me by her vivacity and grace beyond any human figure that has survived from the ancient world. Sir John Marshall writes much too coldly about her, but he does full justice to the torso of a dancer in black stone, from Harappa, so astonishing in skill of its rendering of a difficult pose, that some have argued that it must date from the period of



Greek influence. But it is on the numerous seals that the reputation of these earliest Indian artists mainly rests. The best of them are masterpieces of the engraver's art, as vivid in their drawing as they are skilful in execution. To them, indeed, we owe most of our knowledge of this civilisation. No progress, unhappily, has been made towards deciphering the pictographic script which accompanies the designs. It seems to read from right to left and the three or four hundred signs probably had a syllabic value. Professor Langdon reports in a hasty note that they closely resemble the proto-Sumerian script, and argues (though his demonstration does not seem convincing) that they were the parents of the Brahmi alphabet.

The seals supply, first of all, the only sure evidence for dating this civilisation. Five Indian seals have been found in the cities of Sumeria and Elam, two of them in strata which certainly belong of the time before King Sargon. Perhaps Sir John Marshall uses this fact rather modestly to date these cities. These seals certainly belong to this culture, but did not necessarily come either from Mohenjo-Daro or Harappa. They may have come, for example, from the hypothetical site to which the people of the former city

removed. The style did not change as time went on. It is therefore conceivable that Mohenjo-Daro\* flourished some centuries before the dates (3250-2750 B. C.) which he assigns to it. What is certain is that it cannot be dated later.

Most of the seals show animals presumably sacred to the gods of the city. The creature most often depicted is a unicorn, which may have had the place in early Indian symbolism that it afterwards held in Persian mythology. Next in honour comes the humped bull, not the sacred Aryan cow, but Siva's symbol. These artists had the same habit as the Sumerians of inventing fantastic composite animals. In both lands deities wore horns. We see on one seal a figure half-human half-animal at grips with a tiger, who comes (it has been argued) straight out of the Gilgamesh epic: he is said to be that hero's companion Eabani, who on Sumerian seals destroys a lion.† Some elements then of a common mythology both peoples had. One notes that both wore the same peculiar kilt: both wore their hair in a bun. To my mind such facts (and there are many more) suggest a racial and not merely a trading connection. *The tradition of the Sumerian city of Eridu‡ was that civilisation came to it from the sea. Much*

\* Cf. "Vedic Chronology": A case for 11,000 B. C. in THE ARYAN PATH for April 1931 and "Antiquities of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro" in THE ARYAN PATH for January 1930, both by Prof. S. V. Venkateswara.—EDS.

† This is Sir John Marshall's interpretation, but to my eyes the figure is certainly a female, and seems to be connected with the Tree of Life.—H. N. B.

‡ Theosophical students should read what H. P. Blavatsky has to say about this famous city and its commercial and religious relation to India—*The Secret Doctrine*, II, 139, 203, 226, 693.—EDS.

*points to the possibility that the Indus civilisation was the earlier of these two, and may have been one of the several influences that started Mesopotamia on its great career.*

Another group of seals shows a procession in which an image of the unicorn was carried on a standard. Behind it is carried the curious cult object, perhaps a censer, which is always shown with it. Before it is another object which exactly resembles the standard with a long streamer peculiar to pre-dynastic Egypt. These three seals are companions to the picture of a procession carrying sacred beasts shown on a slate palette of Narmer, one of the earliest Egyptian kings. Similar standards are in use today, as Professor Elliott Smith has shown, in Indonesia. What conclusion shall we draw? Not necessarily that early Egypt and early India were in direct touch. But certainly we must conclude that a whole complex of ideas and rites connected with kings, standards, sacred and probably totemic animals, was somehow common to Egypt and India. Perhaps as Professor Childe has argued, there was a fourth sea-faring and pioneering civilisation in Arabia, which linked the Nile, the Euphrates and the Indus and helped to diffuse beliefs and rites, crafts and institutions. The reports by recent travellers of buried cities even in the central deserts make this guess more plausible.

A third group of seals has, if

possible, an interest even more intimate, for it reveals the origin of some of the oldest and most vital elements of Indian religion. One seal shows a god seated in the contemplative posture of a Buddha on a low throne: two suppliants worship him supported by two nagas. A statue which may represent either a priest or a god is gazing with half-closed eyes on the point of his nose. *One cannot doubt that already at this date Indians practised the discipline of yoga, and held at least the basic beliefs about spirit and matter and the power of self-conquest on which it rests.* A third seal shows us a triune three-faced god, again seated with his limbs exactly in the yogi's posture: the animals that accompany him justify Sir John Marshall's conviction that, by whatever name, this city honoured Siva, the patron and teacher of yogis. His head-dress resembles that of the Great Mother—evidently they were a divine pair. We meet still more frequently his *linga* and his bull. The Great Mother shared with him the devotion of the Indus people. The clay statuettes that represent her have been in every house. They are of the same crude archaic type that occurs all over the ancient world: there is in the British Museum a specimen from Cyprus which one can hardly distinguish from these Indian images. Under innumerable names, she, too, lives on, sometimes in terrible, sometimes in beneficent shapes, in every village of the Peninsula.



But indeed though they had their original rites and beliefs, this people adhered to the Catholic Church of their age. Like every agricultural folk, they invoked the principle of fertility and vegetation as a tree, spirit or goddess, and she too figures on these seals. On one of them she gives birth to a bough. The *pipal* was her home, and then as now the marriage of trees was celebrated. *Nothing of this ancient world has*

*perished—neither its cottons, nor its gods.* If the contribution of the Aryans recedes, as the result of these discoveries, in our picture of the enduring life of the permanent thing that is India, her isolation is ended in another way. She takes her place with the pioneers who in these breathless centuries of invention created civilisation between the waters of the Indus and the Nile.

H. N. BRAILSFORD

*The Six Ways of Knowing*—A critical study of the Vedanta Theory of Knowledge. By D. M. DATTA, M. A., Ph. D. (George Allen and Unwin, London. 15s.)

Putting together the subject-matter of his investigation of a distinctive problem of Indian Philosophy, conducted when he had the privilege of occupying the Prabodha Chandra Basu Mallik Chair of Indian Philosophy in the period 1925-28, Dr. Datta has discussed the status and significance of the *Six Pramanas*, means, sources and guarantors of valid knowledge advocated by the Advaitic system of thought, subjecting them to critical analysis and evaluation in the light of the epistemological technique current in contemporary speculation in the West. Believing that in "an age of international understanding," interpretation of the problems of Indian Philosophy to the West is essential, and feeling that notwithstanding the work of some Indian and European thinkers in this sphere there is yet enough scope for others, the author has endeavoured to "present, after critical analysis and evaluation the contribution of *some* Indian thinkers in a special branch of philosophy". (Preface.)

Having localised and marked off the boundaries of "Prama" (valid knowledge) and "Pramana" (source, means and guarantor of valid knowledge) in the

"Introduction," Dr. Datta devotes the First Book extending over five chapters to the epistemology of "Pratyaksha" (Perception). In the first chapter, the inevitability of a reaction between epistemology and metaphysics is emphasised. The second discusses the definition of "Pratyaksha," and the third the "psychology of perception". It is obvious that perception or any other process is psycho-physical or psycho-somatic and points to a subject-object relation. The fourth chapter deals with the subject or the self in perception. The objects of perception are dealt with in the fifth. "Upamana" (comparison) "Anupalabdhi" (non-cognition) and "Anumana" (Inference) form the subject-matter of second, third, and the fourth books respectively. The fifth Book examines "Arthapatti" (postulation). The sixth, and concluding book running over six chapters undertakes a pretty elaborate survey of the "Sabda-Pramana" (Testimony).

From this summary, it is clear that Dr. Datta has concentrated his expository and critical attention on the *six* pramanas admitted and advocated by the Advaita Vedanta, and as embodied in shorter manuals and primers like the "Vedanta Paribhasha". In all the relevant contexts he has successfully correlated the Vedantic doctrines with those prevalent in the West. While the

general exposition, method of treatment, control over texts are all commendable, certain statements made by Dr. Datta in the course of the volume call for critical comments.

(1) In the first place, Dr. Datta's treatment of the doctrine of "Adhyasa" in relation to the "Pramanas" is unfortunately very scrappy, and the scrappiness has pushed into the background a problem of paramount importance in the Advaitic theory of knowledge. The contrast between "objects as they are" and "objects as they appear to be" is as old as Parmenides, and Sankara has maintained that all the affairs and transactions of life, secular and spiritual, owe their origin to a Fontal or Foundational Folly—Adhyasa—erroneous or error-ridden ascription of the qualities of "Atma" to the "Anatma" and those of the latter to the former. In his Bhashya on the Vedanta Sutra, the Acharya makes his position clear with remarkable brilliance. "Tametamavidyakhya-maatmanatmanoritaretaradhyasam-puraskritya-sarve-pramanaprameya-vyavaharah-laukika-vaiddikascha-pravrittah". (Page 20, Bombay Edition—with Bhamati, Ratnaprabha, and Anandagiriya.) Dr. Datta has examined the six Pramanas, but, their operations, jurisdiction, the results they lead to are all enveloped in a colossal cosmic error, or Fontal, Foundational Folly. Here, if anywhere, there is a real and genuinely felt philosophical need for a thorough critical investigation. In the history of Indian philosophy, the existence of the Fontal, Foundational Folly has been controversially repudiated by the followers of Ramanuja and Madhva, and in the onward march of European and American system-building as well the Kantian contrast between "things as they are" and "things as they appear" has been shown its proper place by Realists, and I regret to have to observe that Dr. Datta in a volume exclusively devoted to a discussion of the problem of the Pramanas admitted and advocated by the Advaitins, has not investigated if any rational or reason-sanctioned authority can be cited in support of the exis-

tence of the said Fontal Folly. A perception like S is P is invested by the Advaitins with an air of monistic mysticism, and the "Advaita Siddhi" explains how the "Antah-karana" takes on the form of objects perceived, and how at the moment of perception an electric-flash like identity is established among three self-units or spiritual units. (Pramatrichaitanya-vishayaprakasaka-chaitanya—and adhishthana-chaitanya.)

A doctrine like this deserves to be brought before the bar of reason, but, Dr. Datta has merely glossed over the entire question. While on page 50, "Adhyasa" is done into "confused mutual identification," on page, 52, it is translated into "mutual association". The Vedantic "Antahkarana" may or may not stand comparison with the "Physiological Gestalt," (p. 68) but the relevant question is—is the knowledge in the engendering of which "Antahkarana" plays such a prominent part confined merely to the realm of appearances?

(2) Secondly, Dr. Datta uses in one and the same paragraph, three terms "sources," "ways" and "methods" in translating the term "Pramana". (p. 19.) This state of affairs is surely unfortunate. A Pramana is not merely the source or means of valid knowledge, but also a guarantor of the validity of knowledge. When the sense-object rapprochement is normal or normally established, knowledge is valid and the validity is guaranteed by the rapprochement itself.

(3) Dr. Datta's attempt at showing that "Arthapatti" is "postulation" has landed him in a strange predicament. Assumptions and postulates, methodological and otherwise, are admitted as foundations for the erecting of the superstructure of a given science. Indian Psychological investigation postulates the reality of "souls". The familiar illustration is this. An individual Dick or Devadatta who fastidiously fasts during the day time is hale, hearty, and healthy. How are the observed health and happiness of the individual to be



reconciled with his daily fasting programme? Surely, fasting and perfect health are incompatible with one another. To bring about as it were a factual as well as a speculative reconciliation between day-time fasting and the observed unimpaired health of the individual, it has to be admitted that the said individual should have enjoyed a delicious diet during nights!! In the absence of this admission, an observed and noted fact, namely, the health of the individual becomes inexplicable. The admission is necessitated by the Laws of Thought and corresponds to indirect proof of demonstration with which one is familiar in works on Western Logic. It involves a passage or transition from the known to the unknown. From this interpretation of "Arthapatti" to Dr. Datta's term "postulation" actually used, it is indeed a far cry. If the terminology of Western Inductive Logic is to be employed, "Arthapatti" indicates passage procedure from an observed effect or phenomenon to its hidden cause. From the very nature of the case and the circumstances attending on it, the hidden cause may not be dragged from its logical Purdah as it were and exhibited to the unholy gaze of the public.

(4) I find that the Vedantic dictum "S a r v a m-jnyatataya-ajnyatatayachasakshi bhasyam" is cited twice first on page 77, and secondly on page 78. One of the citations appears to me to be redundant.

(5) The last quarter of the stanza quoted in the third footnote found on page 130, should read "Abhedo-tila-taddhiyah" and not as wrongly printed.

(6) Dr. Datta has absolutely no justification whatever when he makes reference to "Gauda-brahmanandi" on page 72. Brahmananda Sarasvati has written a commentary on "Advaita Siddhi" of Madhusudana Saraswati, entitled "Guruchandrika," and this latter work is also known after its

author "Brahmanandiyam". In these days when non-violence is claiming and gaining recognition as a universal method of dealing with one's fellowmen, Dr. Datta does great violence to the Vedantic or Sanskrit Philosophical Muse when he describes the work of Brahmananda as "Brahmanandi".

(7) A comic element which would lift dry-as-dust metaphysics into the regions of romance lurks in the description of the scope of Dr. Datta's work printed on the outer-most green cover. While the publishers' announcement heralding the volume claims that "this volume gives a comprehensive and clear survey of the principles of *Indian Logic* (italics mine) with due references to corresponding features of Occidental Logic," according to the author, what is attempted is a "Critical study of the Vedanta Theory of Knowledge".

(8) Why does Dr. Datta render "Sabda" into "Testimony"? It is perfectly legitimate to speak of the testimony of perception and of inference, and the correct rendering is obviously "valid verbal testimony".

(9) Finally, Dr. Datta sums up "that the Advaita view that the conditions of knowledge itself are the grounds both of its validity and the knowledge of its validity is reasonable". (pp. 338-339.) Surely, it is reasonable, but, I hope that Dr. Datta cannot have forgotten the fact that the "conditions" themselves are error-ridden in virtue of "Adhyasa".

None of these comments would affect the general excellence of the systematic treatment of the Advaita Theory of Knowledge attempted by Dr. Datta and I congratulate him in conclusion on his fine volume on "The Six Ways of Knowledge" which constitutes a splendid and brilliant addition to the stock of existing literature on Indian Philosophy.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

*Those Superstitions.* By Sir CHARLES IGGLESDEN (Jarrolds, London. 6s.)

Sir Charles Igglesden has for many years made a hobby of collecting old beliefs which are now gathered in this book. It is a popular collection, of the kind that prompts the reader to add a few from his own experience. Those who take more than a casual interest in the subject may well complain that the author has jumbled superstitions from all kinds of places, sources, and times without any indication of their origin; and some of the explanations are startling. It may, perhaps, be fact that "those men who took an active part in the exploration of Tutan-khamen's tomb perished one by one" though the chief explorer seems to have survived; but it is harder to believe the statement that "there is no doubt that the ancient Egyptians, as in most things, knew as much about poisonous gas as we know to-day, and when they reverently sealed up the tombs of their dead permeated the atmosphere with fumes of gas which should poison anyone who broke into the sanctuary". This is sheer nonsense; all the rest of the royal tombs were robbed within a few generations of their first sealing.

*Medieval India.* By A. YUSUF ALI. (Humphrey Milford, London. 5s.)

The history of Medieval India, like the history of the Middle Ages of Europe, is just beginning to receive the serious attention of scholars. The long neglect of this period was most undeserved because the so-called modern history of India cannot be understood without constant reference to our medieval history. But with a pathetic historical bigotry the previous generation of writers continued to treat Indian history into water-tight compartments like Hindu, Mahamadan and British periods which are as communal as they are wrong from the point of view of organic evolution of Indian history. It was high time that the overlapping and interpenetration of the Hindu, the Mahamadan and the Christian elements should be

The author has gathered his collection into kinds "The Flower," "Courtship," "Tragedy" and so forth. It is interesting to re-group them, when many will fall into one of three categories: protective—to ward off evil; magical—to bring about some end which cannot be achieved by normal means; and crude science. It is not utterly unreasonable for shepherds to destroy twin black lambs at birth lest they bring disaster, for abnormalities betoken a disturbance in the course of nature and the intrusion of some unknown factor; eugenists, if they could, would do the same with human black sheep. The midwife who slipped a boy's shirt on a baby girl so that she should grow up attractive to men was in an indirect way using magic to provide future employment. Whilst the gardener who proclaimed that it was useless to grow shallots unless planted on the shortest day and collected on the longest was merely expressing in forcible terms the cultural note that shallots planted in December are ready to ripen off in June; by a curious coincidence on the day after I read this book my gardener made the same observation with an apologetic "they say".

G. B. HARRISON

brought out forcibly to counteract the unhistorical bias of the previous generation. The Hindu historians should pay more and more intensive and sympathetic attention to the study of Islamic history and institutions and the Mahamadan historians should show larger tolerance for and deeper interest in the life of their Hindu neighbours who after all are co-partners in the colossal undertaking of building a New India. It is a very hopeful sign that Hindu historians like Prof. Jadunath Sarkar, Prof. Beni Prasad, Prof. Iswari Prasad and others have come forward as real pioneers in this line of historical research and we welcome Mr. Yusuf Ali, the author of this important little volume, as our first Moslem *confrère* in this great task of historical *rapprochement* between Hindu and Islamic India. Like a true



historian that he is, Mr. Yusuf Ali emphasises the fundamental importance of the sense of continuity: "The breaking up of our history into water-tight compartments works almost as much mischief as false history. If Muslims and Hindus fought with each other in the past, there is no reason why the feuds should be continued in changed circumstances in the present and in the future."

It is highly inspiring and refreshing to find a Muslim author making a thoroughly objective and at the same time deeply sympathetic study of Hindu social and economic life from the 7th to the 14th century (A. D.) King Harsha (647 A. D.), that incarnation of religious tolerance; the Poet Rajasekhara (900 A. D.)—a Brahmin marrying a Rajput princess; Alauddin Khalji, (1316 A. D.)

a pioneer of socialism and total prohibition; and Firoz Taghlauk of great public works (1388 A. D.), each in his turn comes to contribute their quota to the general progress of India. So on the plane of Spiritual synthesis "Kabir and Guru Nanak may be cited as examples in a large galaxy of religious and social reformers who prepared the way for modern India". This vast historical canvas is worthy of an epic brush of a Michelangelo bringing out the vigorous modelling as well as the dramatic conflict of light and shade in the representation of this Indian fresco of "War and Peace". But even miniature studies on this subject, as done by Mr. Yusuf Ali with the eye of a painter, are welcome. The get-up of the book is worthy of the Oxford University Press.

KALIDAS NAG

*Prometheus Bound.* By AESCHYLUS. Translated into English Rhyming Verse with Introduction and Notes by GILBERT MURRAY. (Allen & Unwin, London. 2s.)

Although it is usually recognised that the legend of Prometheus embodies a profound philosophical idea, there has never been any agreement as to its proper significance. Many writers have maintained that it represents a mythological account of the discovery of fire by primitive man. Professor Gilbert Murray rightly ignores this superficial view. He suggests, rather, that the legend should be taken to describe the endless struggle of man, conscious within himself of moral values, to impose them upon a world which appears to be totally indifferent to them.

There is, indeed, a hint of the truth in this hypothesis, but, stated in such general terms, it strikes one as being devoid of precise connotation. For an exact, penetrating, and thorough discussion of the subject we must still go to *The Secret Doctrine* where Madame Blavatsky explains this. At least three distinct meanings may be discerned in her interpretation; distinct but not unrelated; distinct, but uniting to form a single great cosmological conception.

In the first place, the conflict which is of the essence of the legend is the conflict within human nature between its higher and lower elements. Prometheus here stands for the intellectual and spiritual aspects of man, while Zeus is the symbol of the physical, animal, sensual aspects. Or, to take man in the ideal sense, humanity itself is Prometheus tormented by the eternal vulture of unsatisfied desire and bound by the chains of its bestial instincts. (S. D. II, 412-414) This perpetual and undeniable conflict is attributed by Madame Blavatsky to the circumstances of man's origin according to the esoteric doctrine, which teaches that man is the joint creation of two different orders of cosmic entities. Zeus is the symbol of the primeval progenitors, the *Pitar*, who created the earliest races of man on a level with the members of the animal kingdom, "senseless and without mind". The fire brought down from "heaven" as a gift to mankind is the sacred spark of reason and spiritual consciousness infused into the animal man by a class of "devas" not indigenous to the earth and symbolised by Prometheus. The complete man of our race has been fashioned by this combination of spiritual and material forces. (*ibid.* 94-95)

Finally, the Promethean gift becomes a "curse" because it is blended with the refractory material of the lower nature. Spiritual development on the one hand, and mental and physical on the other, being incapable of proceeding at an equal pace, engender disharmony and give rise to Evil. Mankind is saved from mental darkness but at the cost of its former tranquillity. "The sin and redemption of Prometheus consists in preferring intellectual, self-conscious

pain to instinctive beatitude." In thus raising man to a way of life that involves suffering, and thereby himself merging with man, Prometheus sacrifices his heavenly existence to share in the pains and tribulations of humanity. (*ibid.* 410-415)

Such is the explanation, supported by a wealth of philological and anthropological data, which the student will find in *The Secret Doctrine*.

K. S. SHELIVANKAR

*Our Compelling Gods and Life's Evolutionary Cycle.* By H. F. HAWES. (Headley Brothers, London.)

Mr. Hawes builds his book upon the theory of the "group-spirit," a term used by Professor McDougall for the collective consciousness of any association of men or animals. He starts with the assumption that evolution is cyclical, with an outward movement from the one to the many, and a return movement back to unity; and endeavours to prove that this return swings, in which humanity is now moving, operates by the formation of ever larger and larger groups. Each one of these has its own "spirit," which is, in the author's words:

more or less of a divinity to the units which form its group, and religion with all that the word implies is man's reaction to the influence of the spirit of the largest group he is at any stage conscious of belonging to . . . we can in imagination go beyond the human race and postulate a group-spirit which has for its kingdom all creation . . . Such a spirit . . . would possess all the qualities characterising the Christian's idea of God.

Mr. Hawes endeavours to prove the existence of this "Universal Group-Spirit," or God, by a process of analogy from the lesser "group-spirits," whose existence he assumes. But there is no real analogy at all in the matter. The collective consciousness of a human group is the creation of the thought of its units, and is charged with their emotion as a Leyden jar is charged with electricity. It is a secondary, derived, phenomenon, which arises and passes away in time; whereas the reality underlying all phenomena—variously called

the Absolute, the Self, the One Life, Parabrahm—is timeless, eternal, immutable.

Nevertheless, despite this fallacy in his main argument, Mr. Hawes's book, which is fundamentally an attempt to restate Christianity in terms of human experience, will be of interest, not only to his fellow Christians of the broader type, but to thinkers of all religions.

Mr. Hawes posits conscious membership of the universal group as the goal of human evolution. He recognises the brotherhood of all men and the essential oneness of the high religions. To Buddhism in particular he makes several sympathetic references, though there is no sign that he has made any close study of its literature. Some of its teachings, however, he seems to have worked out for himself.

On the subject of re-incarnation Mr. Hawes has come to no certain conclusion, although he recites some very cogent reasons in its favour.

"If we do not (reincarnate)" he says, "the lesson, in so far as we do learn it, would seem to be invalid for any other life but this earthly one . . ."

The ordinary Western tenet of the immortality of the personal self does not appeal to Mr. Hawes; and no wonder! Only when distinction is made between the personality, which dies, and the individuality, which persists to pursue the path to perfection through a series of rebirths, does the doctrine of survival become satisfying at once to our reason, our sense of justice, and our highest aspirations.

R. A. V. M.



*In the Footsteps of the Buddha.* By RENE GROUSSET. (Routledge, London.)

Those who are familiar with *The Life of Hiuen-Tsiang* and *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, translated by the Rev. Samuel Beal, will welcome M. René Grousset's scholarly contribution to our knowledge of this great Chinese pilgrim who served Buddha with unflinching devotion and with a courage beyond praise. M. Grousset has added much new material based upon the discoveries of Sir Aurel Stein, Herr Von Le Coq and other writers who have within recent years found so much of vital interest in Central Asia. His commentary is never obtrusive and his learned disquisitions never cloud the radiance of Hsüan-tsang and his noble quest. In M. Grousset's Foreword he refers to "this immense effort towards goodness and beauty," and in the pages that follow he never forgets that he is dealing with a spiritual adventure, with a learned saint whose wisdom was no less than his courage in time of danger.

At the commencement of the T'ang dynasty Hsüan-tsang, when about twenty-six years old, set forth on his long journey to India. He endured hunger, thirst, was set upon by bandits and wild animals, experienced bitter cold and scorching heat, was constantly abused by those he encountered. He endured all things with a fortitude that never failed. He was determined to see some of the sacred places associated with Buddha, resolved to bring back from India, his Holy Land, various Buddhist texts, written in Sanskrit, in order to amplify the Buddhist literature in China which was in many ways defective. He was absent sixteen years, but during that period he had fulfilled his mission. He brought back to China six hundred sacred books and many Buddhist relics and statues. In the seclusion of the Convent of the Great Beneficence, with a carefully chosen staff to help him, he set to work on translation and commentary. "Each morning," we read, "he set himself a fresh task, and if during the day some busi-

ness had prevented him from completing it, he never failed to go on with it at night. If he met with some difficulty, he would put the book down, and then, after worshipping Buddha and fulfilling his religious duties until the third watch, he would rise and read aloud the Indian text and mark in red ink, one after another, the passages he was to read at sunrise."

Hsüan-tsang was an uncompromising Mahāyānist. He would frequently engage in learned discourse concerning the Greater Vehicle, and was, perhaps, an almost fanatical adherent of this particular form of Buddhism. This splitting of metaphysical hairs, the meaning of "absolute nature," "non-duality" and so on will seem to some of us far removed from the simpler and more direct teaching of the Buddha. If we question the wisdom of setting great store by such Buddhist metaphysicians as Asaṅga, we are in no doubt as to Hsüan-tsang's attitude toward the Master he served so well. The long self-sacrificing journey is convincing proof of the spiritual power within this Chinese Master of the Law.

In 664, when finishing his translation of the *Prajñā Pāramitā* ("The Perfection of Sapience"), he was rapidly approaching the end of his earthly existence. A few hours before his death he saw "an immense lotus flower of charming freshness and purity". He said to his disciples: "I desire to see the merit I have acquired by my good deeds poured out on other men; to be born with them in the Heaven of the Blessed Gods (Tushita), to be admitted into the household of Maitreya and there to serve that Buddha who is so full of tenderness and love. When I return to earth to live out other existences, I desire, at each new birth, to fulfil with unbounded zeal my duties towards Buddha and to attain to transcendent understanding". In that lovely confession of faith, that crystal-clear adoration of the Buddha there was no talk of the Greater and Lesser Vehicle. His last words were: "I desire, in common with all men, to see thy loving countenance."

HADLAND DAVIS

## ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———ends of verse

And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

In the *New English Weekly* of 14th July an article "On Being Modern" contains a few suggestive thoughts. All who aim at making the world and themselves better will find these worth a reflection. The writer points out that "it is far easier to be 'fashionable' than to be truly modern—a thing which requires something more than being just up-to-date . . . . What matters is an advanced consciousness which feels the inner pulse of the entire age and is at one with it; at one with all its deepest problems, needs and crises."

The one problem is born of the cardinal defect of our cycle—"the gap between inner and external life". This is the cause of "spiritual restlessness and of estrangement from life".

The crisis is brought about by the pace of external life which "invariably tends to develop at the expense of the inner life". Also the integrity of the human self is doubly attacked; from within by psycho-analysis, which "concentrates upon the inner man—not in order to affirm him, but in order to analyse him away, . . . which eventually makes one forget that such a thing as human individuality exists at all"; secondly, from without, by "the standardising tendency of the capitalist system, as well as its

legitimate but rebellious offspring—Russian Bolshevism".

The need of the hour is "a change which would leave the old consciousness behind as one leaves outworn garments". This will come from the inner urge and need for "a *qualitative* change of all values". "Only those who are ripe for such an attitude can afford to be modern without becoming victims of their own modernity".

But how to become ripe? The article does not tell us. Those who are ripe well know what to do, but what about those who aspire to attain ripeness? In these pages, month by month, some of the most advanced thinkers have shown how religious organizations and political parties hinder the individual in his real growth; how modern science must abandon its old methods and seek aid from philosophy and mysticism; how scientific achievements disturb the moral balance of society; how men and women looking for liberty break the bonds of convention only to find themselves fettered by indulgence and licence; how individuals must aim at making themselves, whole. Not afraid of committing the sin of inconsistency this Journal has welcomed different and even conflicting views, and if it has



succeeded in revealing anything it is the prevalence of the confusion of thought among guides, philosophers and friends of our civilization, about its most crucial problem—integration of the human individual and of the human society. These “leaders” are specialists, each of whom has purposely limited his own horizon; and modern knowledge is an incoördinate and even incoherent mass. How can man integrate himself when the thoughts on which he dwells are disintegrating? He who wishes to ripen must enquire after a *synthesis* of religion, philosophy and science.

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Theosophy has taught for ages that every human being is surrounded by an aura which emits rays, beneficent and maleficent. The healing hand, the soothing tone, the evil eye, the withering touch are homely expressions which describe processes well known in occult physiology. A German scientist, Dr. Rahn, now professor of Bacteriology at Cornell University (U.S.A.) is reported (*Science News Letter* for 2nd July) to have “aroused great interest among scientists attending the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Society of American Bacteriologists in Syracuse by announcing experiments that seem to parallel scientifically in some respects old superstitions that the human body can exert

an evil influence on its surroundings”. As usual the experimenter and his colleagues have jumped to certain conclusions which are as worthless as explanations of the phenomena as the latter are interesting in themselves. Leaving speculation alone let us record the facts actually observed:

Yeast, such as is used in making bread, was killed in five minutes merely by the radiation from the finger tips of one person . . . . . The end of the nose and the eye produce the yeast-killing radiation . . . . . In the tests of fingers it was found that the right hand was stronger than the left even in the case of the left-handed persons . . . . . The blood and saliva produce the radiation, but with different people the rays emitted vary greatly. Some people have the power of producing effective radiations and others do not, while it varies with the same person under different conditions. It was also demonstrated that the human body as a whole sends out rays . . . . . Professor Rahn explained that another investigator several years ago found that the blood of women at certain periods sent out a radiation that killed or damaged micro-organisms.

Numerous are the customs observed even to-day by the “illiterate heathen” in India which must be called hygienic and sanitary practices in the light of the above scientific statements.

Meanwhile what instruction does Theosophy offer?—A subtle invisible essence or fluid emanates from human and animal bodies and even things. It is a psychic effluvium, partaking of both the mind and the body, as it is the electro-vital, and at the same time an electro-mental aura, called âkâsic or magnetic aura.